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In a televised address on the evening of March 31, 1968, just two months after the
Tet Offensive, President Lyndon B. Johnson shocked the nation when he announced, “I
shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your
President.”1 Instead of focusing on a reelection campaign, he wanted to spend his final
nine months in office devoting his attention to achieving peace in Vietnam. This effort,
however, proved futile and the war would drag on for nearly five more years. The war
effort under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford made even less progress than
before. The goal of “peace with honor” resulted in troop withdrawals and the
Vietnamization of the war while American leadership attempted to extricate itself from
the conflict while saving face as best they could. On April 30, 1975, the day Saigon, the
capital of South Vietnam, fell and the eleven year conflict had come to an end, US
citizens were provided with some of the war’s most iconic images: Americans on
rooftops, cramming into the final evacuation helicopters out of Saigon, and the crowds of
South Vietnamese who were abandoned on those same rooftops because the helicopters
had no more room.
1 Kyle Longley, LBJ's 1968: Power, Politics, and the Presidency in America's Year of Upheaval
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 101.
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For the first time in its history, the United States had lost a war. To make matters
worse, the US, one of only two superpowers to come out of World War II, had been
defeated by the tiny, “backward,” and worse still, communist, country of North Vietnam.
While the Vietnamese communists did not repeat the bloodbath that had taken place
following the communist triumph in Cambodia, many former South Vietnamese officials
disappeared, sent off to reeducation camps or worse.2 To a majority of Americans, “in the
end, all the suffering, hopes, and sacrifices, all the blood and death, had been for
nothing.”3 The thousands of American casualties seemed unnecessary.  The 58,000
American dead appeared to have died in vain.  And the death and destruction wreaked on
Vietnam by the US, including estimates of as many as 3 million Vietnamese fatalities,
seemed immoral.
Historiography
During the war itself and certainly in the years that have followed, diverse
arguments regarding the conflict emerged and, as a result, scholars have offered a variety
of arguments about America’s role in Vietnam. There were the critics that argued
America’s intervention in Vietnam was unjustified, possibly even illegal, and that the war
was unwinnable from its inception. Still the war’s supporters disagreed. Some scholars
addressed the entire war, while others have focused on one or more of the war’s more
specific components. The war’s rich historiography ranges from numerous publications
from US and South Vietnamese government officials who held office during the war, to
accounts from officers and soldiers that served in the war, to historians who have spent
much of their lives studying the conflict.
3 Metzner, More Than a Soldier’s War, 189.
2 Edward P. Metzner, More Than a Soldier’s War: Pacification in Vietnam (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University, 1995), 189-190.
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The federal government generated a plethora of sourcdocumentses during the
Vietnam War, creating the contemporary school of thought on the war. These files offer a
window into the various points of assessment articulated by Wasington officials. These
documents included such as meeting notes, various memorandums sent between
numerous high-ranking officials, government departments, and embassies, as well as
policy proposals, National Security Action Memorandums, and action assessments. These
resources are, according to Vietnam War scholar George C. Herring, "an indispensable
source for understanding why the United States intervened in Vietnam and why,
ultimately, it failed to achieve its objectives."4 While the government documents were
often published in collections like Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,
some contemporary sources were authored by eyewitnesses. David Halberstam’s The
Making of a Quagmire, originally published in 1965, was essentially an account of what
Halberstam witnessed as a war correspondent reporting on the war in Vietnam for the
New York Times, although these kinds of sources also included some level of analysis.
For instance, Halberstam, without plainly stating it, does make it apparent that the war in
Vietnam was an unwinnable one, contrary to what was being reported by the government
back home.5
The idea of the war in Vietnam being unwinnable became one of the foundational
arguments made by the war’s Orthodox school of thought, which developed a short time
later. The end of the Vietnam War allowed a more in-depth analysis of the conflict to be
completed by historians, government officials, veterans, and other intellectuals. For the
5 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volumes I-VII (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office); David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during
the Kennedy Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Herring, The Pentagon Papers, xii.
4 George C. Herring, ed., The Pentagon Papers, Abridged Edition (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,
1983), xxii.
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most part, these writers fell into two broad categories known as the Orthodox school and
the Revisionist school. Both arose soon after the war’s end and continue to be the main
interpretations of the war, but they were founded on premises that were near-complete
opposites of each other. Orthodox thinkers offered harsh criticisms because they believed
that Vietnam was immoral and “was a war that could not be won, no matter what.”6 Many
of the Orthodox's leading thinkers, such as Stanley Karnow and George C. Herring,
among others, openly placed the blame for starting the war at the feet of US politicians,
exemplified by Larry Berman’s argument that “Lyndon Johnson’s political decisions were
poorly conceived, frequently contradictory, and ultimately self-defeating.”7 They also
stressed many of the same reasons for America’s defeat, including flawed foundational
attitudes and beliefs regarding Vietnam, assumptions of moral superiority, an incorrect
war strategy, and America's extreme overconfidence in their technology and firepower.8
The Revisionist school gained influence in the 1980s and acknowledged that
things had gone wrong in Vietnam, but they were not nearly as negative as Orthodoxy
intellectuals were. General Alexander Haig, then-Major Barry McCaffrey, and
then-Major Norman Schwarzkopf, all of which were military men during Vietnam, all
exemplified the foundational premise of the Revisionist interpretation of the Vietnam
War: that the war was winnable.9 In their interviews with Gil Dorland, an experienced
9 Gill Dorland, Legacy of Discord: Voices of the Vietnam War Era (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001),
157, 42, 204.
8 Hastings, Vietnam, 740-741; Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into
Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 45;
George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2nd edition (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), ix; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 438.
7 Max Hastings, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-1975 (New York: HarperCollins, 2018), 510; Larry
Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1989), xi.
6 Laura Palmer, “The General at Ease: An Interview with William C. Westmoreland,” In The Cold War: A
Military History, ed. Robert Cowley (New York: Random House, 2005), 309.
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interviewer who served two tours of duty in Vietnam and received the Distinguished
Service Cross, the three military commanders expressed the same sentiment that Gary R.
Hess argued in his book Vietnam and the United States, “the United States should have
carried the war fully and directly against North Vietnam.”10 Instead of blaming the
politicians for getting into the war in the first place like Orthodoxy thinkers, the
Revisionists blamed the politicians’ decision to use the graduated pressure strategy. “The
key to victory was in concentrating U.S. power against North Vietnam to prevent its
infiltration of men and supplies into the South.”11 Not only was it winnable but, according
to historian Norman Podhoretz, the war was “was a product of the Wilsonian side of the
American character - the side that went to war in 1917 to ‘make the world safe for
democracy’... [and thus] there is no rationally defensible way in which it can be called
immoral.”12
As the Revisionist school gained traction, it overshadowed another school coming
about at the time, the Pacification school. For the most part, many of the early
publications covering pacification were government-sponsored studies like the one
conducted by South Vietnamese Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, originally an
eyewitness to the efforts, who concluded that pacification could have been successful.13
In 1995 Richard A. Hunt provided an important work to the emerging Pacification school
with his publication of Pacification.14 The work marked a significant development in the
historiography of the Vietnam War by attempting to fill a particularly large void, “the
14 Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle For Vietnam's Hearts And Minds (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1995).
13 Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1980).
12 Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 197.
11 Hess, Vietnam and the United States, 174.
10 Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Boston: Twayne Publishers,
1990), 174.
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lack of a comprehensive study of American attempts to support the various South
Vietnamese programs that composed pacification.”15 Hunt’s Pacification began by
acknowledging America’s involvement in Vietnam during French colonial rule before
moving into detailed analysis of nation-building efforts during John F. Kennedy’s
presidency. Most of Hunt’s focus however, was on the pacification policies and actions
undertaken during the Johnson administration. All the while, he sought to uncover
whether or not full American control of pacification would have led to a different
outcome to the war overall. In the end, Hunt concluded, it would not have mattered
because America’s defeat in Vietnam was not due to pacification’s failure.
The 1990s saw a surge of autobiographies when some of those involved in the
war decided to tell their stories, creating a Personal Experience school on the Vietnam
War. These first-hand accounts provided readers the often overlooked “human aspects”
associated with the policies and actions implemented in regards to the Vietnam War, thus
offering the audience a glimpse into the real-life result of those decisions. For instance,
the wartime diary of Frank Elkins, a carrier-based fighter pilot in the US Navy, was
published in 1991 and provided a window into his wartime experiences until 1966, when
he was shot down and killed.16 In 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore and Joseph
L. Galloway, a war correspondent, published We Were Soldiers Once, which was their
account of the battle for Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley.17 Colonel
Moore, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), led his troops into the
valley on November 14, 1965 in an attempt to draw the North Vietnamese forces there
17 Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once… and Young: Ia Drang - The Battle
That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992).
16 Frank Elkins, The Heart of a Man: A Naval Pilot’s Vietnam Diary, ed. Marilyn Elkins (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1991).
15 Hunt, Pacification, 2.
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into a massive engagement. And they did. They found themselves in a two-day long
battle during which seventy-nine Americans and at least 834 North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) soldiers were killed.18 The book provides a detailed account of those two days,
and the following two days when the 2nd Battalion, the force that relieved Moore and his
men, was ambushed and sustained massive casualties. Moore’s account provided an
important look into the strategy of US ground forces in Vietnam.
In 1995, Colonel Edward Metzner published his account of the eight years he
spent in Vietnam as a pacification adviser in More Than a Soldier’s War.19 He detailed the
problems he encountered, the solutions he helped implement, and the actions he took part
in during his three tours of duty. As he reflected on his experiences, it is clear that he
blamed both American and South Vietnamese military leaders for pacification’s sluggish
progress. The “other war,” in his opinion, might have proceeded more successfully had
there been more attention focused on the needs of the local population and less on
military tactics. The fact that any progress at all was made in the pacification effort was,
according to Metzner, “a tribute to the advisors’ tenacity.”20 While his accounts added to
the record of personal experiences, Metzner also contributed to the Pacification school of
thought. Although he believed that those who took part “justly can take pride in the
program’s accomplishments,” Metzner countered conclusions made by Pacification
historians Richard Hunt and Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho when he concluded that
pacification may have been ineffectual in the long run.21 A look into another one of the
lesser-known aspects of the war was provided by Gary R. Smith in Death in the Jungle.22
22 Gary R. Smith and Alex Maki, Death in the Jungle: Diary of a Navy SEAL (New York: Ballantine Books,
1994).
21 Metzner, More Than a Soldier’s War, xi.
20 Metzner, More Than a Soldier’s War, 191.
19 Metzner, More Than a Soldier’s War.
18 Moore & Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, 215-216.
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One of the first members of the famous SEAL (Navy Sea, Air, and Land) teams, he
recounted many of the missions he was involved in as a member of SEAL Team 1, which
operated in the Mekong Delta from 1967 to 1968.
Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense for both President John F.
Kennedy and Johnson, published a memoir, In Retrospect (1996), in which he looks back
at Vietnam “to show the full range of pressures and the lack of knowledge that existed at
the time.”23 While they believed they were doing good, McNamara explained, in
hindsight he believed that they were wrong to intervene in Vietnam and were presented
with several opportunities to withdraw before 1965, one of which should have been
taken.24 Instead, America went to war and McNamara discussed the decisions made, how
those decisions were made, and, in regards to those that failed, what should have been
done.  With the benefit of hindsight, McNamara identified eleven reasons for America’s
defeat, which included: the misjudgement and/or underestimation of the cultures, events,
and people in North and South Vietnam; the implementation of decisions made and
strategic failures; the overestimation of ourselves and our supposed power; and finally,
the organizational failure that impeded our government and military leadership from
being able to effectively deal with both the political and military issues.25
A similar, yet much shorter, work by the former chief of the South Vietnamese
Air Force and Prime Minister of South Vietnam, Ngo Cao Ky, also evaluated the reasons
for America’s defeat.26 How We Lost The Vietnam War was especially significant because
it was from the point of view of a South Vietnamese government official. Ky used his
26 Ngo Cao Ky, How We Lost The Vietnam War (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002).
25 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 321-323.
24 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, xx, 320.
23 Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New
York: Random House International, 1996), xx.
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experiences with the US during his time as both the Air Force chief and the Prime
Minister and found three main reasons for the defeat. He identified a disastrous advisory
campaign by the Americans as a critical reason for defeat.27 America’s failure to win
South Vietnamese hearts and minds played a role as well, along with the US
implementing their limited war strategy incorrectly.28 Gil Dorland’s Legacy of Discord is
a collection of postwar interviews including two journalists, ten military members, two
antiwar advocates, three government officials, and two South Vietnamese, one of which
was a member of the VC and the other an ARVN colonel. It is apparent through the
answers of interviewees (benefitting from hindsight) that there is a near-universal
agreement that, since attrition, search-and-destroy, and graduated escalation continued to
be used, the war was unwinnable. The only dissenters were three US military officers
who served in Vietnam.
Vietnam veterans from all branches of the military continued publishing their
wartime experiences into the twenty-first century. Although some of these contribute to
the historiographical debate with their own arguments, the majority of these sources do
more to provide readers with a window into the wartime experiences of these
servicemembers. Insider glimpses into America’s bombing campaigns were provided by
those who had been in the cockpit, pilots like Jerry Cook, who flew fighter-bombers for
the US Air Force in Vietnam and went on to become a brigadier general.29 Jerry Childers
provided a glimpse into a new style of aerial warfare used in Vietnam, helicopter warfare.
In Without Parachutes, Childers recounted his training and a few dozen of the missions
he flew in Vietnam, while also providing expert explanations of the strategies and tactics
29 Jerry Cook, Once A Fighter Pilot (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2002).
28 Ky, How We Lost The Vietnam War, 141, 143-144.
27 Ky, How We Lost The Vietnam War, 125.
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involved in helicopter-based combat, having been one of the men who helped create it.
The experiences of US Marines on the ground were explained by Jerome Doherty, a
platoon commander while in Vietnam, and David Adams, a Lance Corporal stationed on
Hill 55 in defense of the airbase located in nearby Danang.30
During the final decade of the 20th century, a new group of historians arose and
claimed that involvement in Vietnam was unavoidable because of the nature of the Cold
War.31 Published in 1988, Lloyd C. Gardner’s Approaching Vietnam: From World War II
through Dienbienphu argued that the Korean War was critical to American intervention in
Vietnam. According to Gardner, “Truman now felt perfectly safe in recommending a
‘military mission’ for Indochina, to protect a valuable Cold War investment.”32 Gardner,
along with Ted Gittinger, built on this idea of Vietnam as an investment nine years later
in Vietnam: The Early Decisions. South Vietnam became more than just an investment in
Southeast Asia for America, “it had become a Cold War symbol, a pawn in the larger
struggle against Soviet expansionism.”33 Vietnam itself did not pose a threat to the United
States, but the loss of any country, especially this pawn, to Communism was a disturbing
thought for the American government.34 It was due to these Cold War aspects, Stephen
Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley explained, that President Johnson believed “it was in
34 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938,
9th edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), xiii-xiv.
33 Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, Vietnam: The Early Decisions (Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press, 1997), 14.
32 Lloyd C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dienbienphu (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1988), 97.
31 Michael Lind, Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military
Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1999), 256.
30 Jerry Childers, Without Parachutes: How I Survived 1,000 Attack Helicopter Combat Missions In
Vietnam (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2005); David Adams Hill - 55: Just South of Danang Vietnam
(Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2002).
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America’s self-interest - and it was her duty - to use military force to stop the spread of
Communism.”35
The Cold War was not the only lens through which the US intervention in
Vietnam was viewed. Other historians at the turn of the century chose to focus on the
civil leadership in charge of conducting the Vietnam War and, naturally, President
Johnson received much of the attention. Doris Kearns Goodwin, who helped Johnson
create a biographical work after his presidency, reminded audiences that when Johnson
took office, behind him was a century of American involvement and concern with Asia. It
was a century that witnessed three Pacific wars, two decades of Cold War and feared
possibility of a nuclear apocalypse, and a widely held belief that the area of confrontation
was shifting to the third world.36 Regardless of all this, LBJ could have avoided war but
there was the ever-pervasive “‘Cold War consensus’... [which] dictated that commitment
to South Vietnam had to be maintained, through major military escalation if necessary.”37
George Herring pointed out, however, that high-ranking civil officials neglected any
methodical discussions of the war’s fundamental issues, such as how the war should be
fought, a clear military mission, or resource limitation for the war.38 Even without a plan
for victory, Johnson remained dedicated to his policy of doing enough to avoid defeat, but
no more.39 These kinds of policies have led historians like William Hosch and Robert
39 H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That
Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), 297.
38 George C. Herring and United States Air Force Academy, “Cold Blooded”: LBJ’s Conduct of Limited
War in Vietnam, Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 33 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force
Academy, 1990), 1-2.
37 Fredrik Logevall, “‘There Ain’t No Daylight’: Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of Escalation,” in Making
Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives, ed. Mark Philip and Marilyn
B. Young, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 91, 98.
36 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin,
2019), 391-392.
35 Ambrose & Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, 217.
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Curley to argue that “in retrospect, Johnson’s… strategic conception was grounded in
folly and hubris. He and advisers had no clear notion of what application of American
force was supposed to achieve.”40 This seems to support H.R. McMaster’s position that
“the war in Vietnam was not lost in the field… It was lost in Washington, D.C.”41 There
was yet another new interpretation, however, that flew in the face of that conclusion.
Yet another cohort of historians arrived with the new century and focused their
attention on addressing specifics regarding military leadership during the Vietnam War.
In Working-Class War, author Christian G. Appy shifted the focus away from policy
makers and the war’s generals and offered an examination of the experiences of US
ground forces in Vietnam. He explained that, despite the massive amount of artillery and
air power used by US forces, the Communist forces still maintained tactical and strategic
control of the war.42 American leadership made few changes though, instead believing
they could bomb the North, and their Communist agents in South Vietnam, into
submission. This strategy, born out of a severe overestimation of being able to pressure
North Vietnam into bending to the Americans’ will, represented one of America’s fatal
flaws in the war.43 These kinds of flaws, according to Andrew J. Birtle, “contributed to
America's defeat, but they were not in themselves responsible for the outcome.”44 For
instance, it should be noted that some doctrine was extremely successful, such as that of
the US Navy and the operations they conducted on the rivers of South Vietnam.45
45 John D. Sherwood, War in the Shallows: U.S. Navy Coastland and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam
1965-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2015), 324.
44 Birtle, COIN, 406.
43 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007), 407.
42 Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1993), 147.
41 McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 333.
40 William L. Hosch, Robert Curley, and Britannica Educational Publishing, The Korean War and the
Vietnam War (Chicago: Rosen Publishing Group, 2009), 202.
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Gregory A. Daddis provided another factor that contributed to the US’s defeat in Vietnam
in his 2011 publication, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and
Progress in the Vietnam War. Part of the problem, according to Daddis, was rooted in the
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) reports regarding the war’s progress,
most of which were inaccurate due to the incorrect metrics being used for progress
measurements.46 Due to their inaccuracies, the reports provided Washington with a vastly
different picture of the war than its reality and thus there seemed to be no reason, at least
in the eyes of America’s leaders, to make any changes.
As demonstrated by the historiography, the war effort had its fair share of
weaknesses, without a doubt, but the arguments that it was an unwinnable war are
incorrect. The foundations for the successful prosecution of the war, and a much greater
chance for victory, were present during Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency. At one point or
another between the deployment of American troops in 1965 and the end of 1968, the
United States had what it needed to win the Vietnam War, but failed to put the pieces
together at once. Unfortunately, not every aspect of the Vietnam War can be addressed in
the space provided. Some aspects remain to be discussed in the following pages,
including a detailed account of ARVN’s various contributions or of the Communists’
many successes. The biggest issue, the one that needed to be addressed first, was the
military strategy employed. One of the biggest failures of General William
Westmoreland’s decision to pursue a war of attrition was not the strategy itself but the
government-imposed limitations regarding operational areas.
46 Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam
War (New York: Oxford, 2011), 9-10.
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The United States had the manpower, the firepower, and the mobility to win a war
focused on the destruction of enemy forces, but only if they were allowed to fully pursue
those forces back to their sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. The
American government gave Westmoreland a significant amount of control over the war’s
strategic aspects but his forces were confined to South Vietnam when they should have
been allowed to destroy the sanctuaries that provided constant respite to the enemy
whenever necessary. The destruction of these sanctuaries would have severely hampered
enemy operations. Military success was, however, still possible without allowing pursuit,
but the government should have intervened further to steer Westmoreland and MACV
away from attrition and towards a strategy that emphasized clear-and-hold actions.
Capturing, holding, and reinforcing an area before advancing would have made guerrilla
activities much tougher in the south and thus would have deprived the North Vietnamese
of a valuable fighting force.
The United States boasted the world’s largest and most sophisticated military.
The US military itself was equipped to successfully pursue either option almost from the
start, and their strength only grew over the near-four year period under examination. For
example, by 1967, the US had 278 maneuver battalions, or around 486,000 boots on the
ground in Vietnam and were thus able to continuously pressure the enemy by conducting
large operations in previously enemy-controlled areas.47 They also held a major
advantage when it came to mobility, since they utilized helicopter transportation to move
around quickly and to otherwise unreachable areas. The other part of the ground-based
efforts was pacification, which struggled early on but made rather significant progress
over the years and reached a peak in 1968. Although the US was not in sole control over
47 Hunt, Pacification, 133.
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the “other war,” they should have done more to ensure that their advisers fully understood
their roles and responsibilities, coordinated with their ARVN counterparts more
successfully, and eliminated the one-year tour of duty concept from the beginning.
Additionally, the United States failed to effectively coordinate military and civil agencies
and operations, for it was during those instances that pacification was at its most
effective.
American airpower proved invaluable during close air support missions and such
campaigns should have been emphasized over Rolling Thunder operations, especially if
pursuit outside of South Vietnam was forbidden. More than likely, Rolling Thunder-type
missions would only have shown effectiveness only if used to “soften up” enemy
defenses ahead of US troops pursuing enemy forces across borders and into their
sanctuaries. The US naval campaign in Vietnam was actually rather highly successful,
especially with the formation of two riverine task forces. The change that most likely
would have been most beneficial was the creation of those two task forces a couple years
earlier than actually took place, which would have allowed for earlier American influence
and control over the areas of the Mekong Delta, an area important to both sides. Although
these ideas might only appear to be suggestions based on hindsight, most of these
changes had been floated around civil or military leadership circles before being turned
down or delayed. Had America been able to put these pieces together all at once during
the time of their greatest strength, between 1965 and 1968, they would have achieved
greater and longer-lasting successes, significantly increasing their chances of achieving




The United States’ decision to intervene in Vietnam was not in response to one
jarring event. There was no Pearl Harbor, no “date to live in infamy,” or September 11,
2001. The decision to fight in Southeast Asia was much more drawn out, with nearly
twenty years of catalysts, stemming from numerous incidents and individuals, building
on one another. Some of these catalysts included the leadership’s own ideologies,
wartime experiences, and perceived threats to the nation’s national security. Over this
period of time, four presidential administrations accepted and advanced many of the same
attitudes, ideas, and concerns as their predecessor. Meanwhile, the legacies of World War
II, combined with Cold War confrontations around the globe and the end of French
colonial rule created the stepping stones to the Vietnam War.
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World War II
The roots of America’s decision to get involved in Vietnam can be found in World
War II’s origins and one of its most influential lessons, known as the Munich analogy.
During the 1938 Munich Conference Britain and France employed a policy of
appeasement towards Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany and its rapid military and territorial
expansion. Instead of confronting Hitler for breaking numerous terms of the 1919 Treaty
of Versailles, they hoped that providing leeway would halt German aggression short of
war. The failure of appeasement, resulting in a second world war, was seen as proof that
appeasement brought conflict, not peace. Thus, US leaders concluded, future aggression
had to be confronted and stopped immediately. “Applied to Vietnam, the lesson of
Munich suggested that if the United States sacrificed Indochina to the communist bloc,
then the communist bloc,” one Vietnam historian asserted, “would grow bolder in its
attempt to subvert and intimidate the noncommunist world,” as well as in its attempts to
spread communism.48
The Cold War
Another crucial result of World War II was the Allied victory itself and, more
specifically, the emergence of the United States as the only democratic superpower in the
world. The United States now stood against the other superpower born of World War II,
the communist Soviet Union, and the Cold War, an era of competition between the two
nations and their ideological blocs, was suddenly at hand.  This created a “vision of the
United States as the defender against the perceived threat of monolithic communist
48 Michael Lind, Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military
Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1999), 41.
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expansion everywhere in the world.”49 This belief was a prime example of a lingering
Wilsonian idealism that seemed to mesh seamlessly with Cold War attitudes. It also led
many American officials to believe that theirs “was the only society capable of creating
social justice and genuine democracy at home and abroad.”50 Such philosophy harkened
all the way back to America’s colonial days and the idea of the “city upon a hill.”51 These
high-minded attitudes were essentially codified by the Truman Doctrine, promulgated on
March 12, 1947, which stated the administration’s commitment to a world-wide
campaign of resistance against Soviet expansionism.52 It concluded with what became
known as the Domino Theory, which stated “It is important to United States security
interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in
Southeast Asia.”53
President Harry Truman had reoriented the way that the nation would respond to
world affairs that posed a threat to the country. The United States now displayed a new
posture when it came to international affairs, a posture that managed to display a much
more confrontational stance without being outright aggressive. The newfound willingness
to confront international threats explained how America found itself, in one way or
another, becoming involved in more and more tiny, “backwards” nations across the globe.
The Cold War extended into the Third World because everywhere Communism appeared
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51 Baritz, Backfire, 26.
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became seen as a potential threat to the US and therefore needed to be confronted.54 After
all, America was the world’s great defender now. That mentality seemed to be validated
in 1949 when China fell to Communism, and created “a preoccupation [in the US] with
‘drawing the line’ in Southeast Asia.” 55 Losing Southeast Asia to Communism would,
according to many American officials, “seriously endanger in the short term, and
critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.”56
While America’s involvement in South Vietnam was initially limited, it began
growing rather continuously over the near-fifteen years and four presidential
administrations spanning between 1950 and the introduction of American troops in
1965.57 The American determination to commit significant amounts of aid to South
Vietnam was closely related to another Asian country, Korea.58 The outbreak of the
Korean War on June 25, 1950, seemed to verify the fears of the Truman administration
regarding Communist expansionism. President Truman realized that many of the other
third-world nations of the Asian continent were at risk of communist uprisings and that
something needed to be done. The French, for example, at that time the colonial ruler of
South Vietnam, known as Indochina, were also engaged in a battle against communist
forces. Truman saw an opportunity to undermine communist expansion efforts on the
Asian continent by aiding the French forces. After all, a victory by any western bloc
country in the fight against communism was a victory for them all. As a result, despite
58 Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 40.
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fighting their own war, 1950 also saw the beginning of an American campaign to support
the French by sending military supplies. Some historians, namely George Herring, have
argued that the Korean War itself, a three-year conflict, “sparked the US’s fundamental
goal of preserving ‘an independent South Vietnam as a bulwark against further
Communist penetration of Southeast Asia.’”59
The Americans emerged from Korea victorious but unfortunately their French
counterparts did not fare nearly as well. After being routed by communist forces during a
nearly-three-month- long siege at Dien Bien Phu, the French forces were decimated and
would withdraw from Vietnam in May 1954. This prompted several important actions by
Truman’s successor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The new president believed that
his nation’s history “‘authorized, if indeed it did not command, the United States to
undertake nation building in Southeast Asia’” and thus expanded America’s role in South
Vietnam.60 He created, in September of that year, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), which “pledged Washington to the defense of southern Vietnam, thus
deepening America’s commitment to the regime.”61 The treaty would play a significant
role eleven years later, as it helped form America’s basis for providing military assistance
to their Vietnamese allies.62
After witnessing the French, the region’s only democratic representative, “lose”
North Vietnam to Communism, Eisenhower and his successors were “determined to limit
further Communist expansion.”63 This determination was further solidified by reports
63 Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Boston: Twayne Publishers,
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from government agencies like the one provided by the National Security Council in
1952. In their assessment, if Southeast Asia fell under communist control, it “would
render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would
seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.”64 The US, in
turn, should do whatever it could to prevent that from happening, whilst ensuring that
they did not overreact because that very possibly could have resulted in the involvement
of the Soviet Union and/or the Chinese. Some of the NSC’s suggested actions included
the support of and coordination with defense efforts already in the area as well as, more
significantly, for the government to strengthen the covert operations already in being
conducted in Vietnam and to design them “to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives
in Southeast Asia.”65 Such operations were focused on training and aiding
anti-Communist guerrilla forces fighting Communist China on the one hand, while also
focusing on the interference with and disruption of Communist China’s lines of
communication and military supply.66
Two years later, as the emphasis on covert operations continued to grow,
government officials created a special operations group that followed the NSC’s advice in
1952: a group that was both stronger and more focused on how they could help achieve
America’s goals. Known as the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), it was tasked with
entering Vietnam covertly and assisting South Vietnamese forces, not French forces as in
the past, in unconventional warfare.67 However, the 1954 Geneva Conference, which
ended the First Indochina War and partitioned Vietnam, prompted the SMM to alter their
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mission and prepare for more overt, paramilitary operations in case the North Vietnamese
attempted a surprise offensive.68 Another significant result of the Geneva Convention was
its call for a presidential election in South Vietnam which resulted in President Ngo Dinh
Diem’s election. Although it was not immediately apparent, Diem’s rule would pose
serious obstacles to US-South Vietnamese relations and result in governmental instability
and the population’s negative attitudes towards their government. Quite possibly the most
significant decision President Eisenhower made regarding American aid to Vietnam came
in 1956 with the creation of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG),
marking America’s decision to assume the responsibilities for equipping and training the
South Vietnamese Army.69 MAAG was not a combat group like its successor would be,
but instead it “was limited to provision of material assistance to the French forces and
indirect provision of military aid to the forces of the Associated States.”70 It would
continue this role until 1962, when it was incorporated into its successor, Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).
Doctrine Formation
It should be noted that, while America’s politicians were the visible actors leading
the country, step-by-step, into a conflict in Vietnam, there were also twenty years of
military developments that were equally significant. The US Army began to pay more
attention to guerrilla warfare following World War II, but they had next to nothing in their
doctrine regarding these new forces. The military went about filling this doctrinal void
towards the end of the 1940s by giving Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann the
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task of writing the Army’s initial doctrine on guerrilla warfare, which he published in
1951.71 There were three main sources from which Volckmann drew for information on
counterguerrilla operations: past American experiences with counterguerrilla warfare, of
which there was not much; the occupation duties during and just after World War II; and
“perhaps most influential… were the precedents established by the Axis powers in
combating Allied resistance movements.”72
The initial doctrine on counterguerrilla warfare, written by Volckmann, was
entitled FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, and published in February
1951. According to FM 31-20, “the first step in any counterinsurgency program was to
formulate ‘a broad, realistic’ politico-military plan that was ‘based on a detailed analysis
of a country, the national characteristics, and the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and
desires of the people.’" Equally necessary, however, were intelligence, propaganda, and
military force. Volckmann laid out three objectives for any counterguerrilla operation:
first, isolate the guerrillas from the civilian population and the support they provided;
second, deny the guerrillas support from external sources; third, destroy the guerrillas.
These objectives could be achieved by conducting one of several different types of
offensive operations. These actions were frequent small-unit patrols, encirclement,
surprise attacks, or pursuit.73
The number of military doctrinal works focused on guerrilla warfare increased
immensely between 1951 and the start of the war in Vietnam. In 1955, the two original
counterinsurgency manuals, both published by Volckmann in 1951, were combined and
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published under the title FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare. Although a consolidation of two
previous publications, there were some updates, such as a greater emphasis on
technology, in particular the use of helicopters for small-unit operations, foreshadowing
the types of operations to be employed in Vietnam. Five years later, the Defense
Department was directed by the National Security Council to develop a new
counterinsurgency doctrine, which would come to include previous American doctrine as
well as that of the British and the French.74 The inclusion of British and French ideas
marked a new trend in American military doctrine. These ideas came from Britain’s
counterguerrilla success in Malaya and, to a lesser extent, France’s experiences in Algeria
and Vietnam.75
The shift was fully reflected only a couple of months later in a paper produced by
the Special Warfare Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations (ODCSOPS) and entitled “Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for
the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations."76 A combination of
influences from America, Britain, and France, it called for the US to “work primarily
through its military assistance groups and small teams of specialists” whilst arguing that
military force alone could not win such a conflict and warning its readers against such a
path. A four-phase operational plan was offered as well and it began with government
forces arriving at the designated pacification area and establishing numerous local
agencies, both civil and military. Next came offensive operations to destroy and/or
repulse the larger guerrilla forces in the area, followed by the third phase, during which
76 Birtle, COIN, 166.
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those offensive operations were to be directed at the smaller and clandestine guerrilla
bands and support structures. Finally, socio-economic reform programs would be
implemented. Although continuous, aggressive action remained important, it discouraged
the large-scale operations of the past and instead emphasized small-scale, and particularly
heliborne, operations.77
The vast amount of new literature being produced by and for the military during
these years was certainly the most prevalent source on counterinsurgency doctrine.
Additionally, soldiers were also exposed to such ideas in classrooms and on training
fields. The Army, in 1957, even published a manual on how to teach counterguerrilla
concepts to soldiers. They went a step further in January 1961 with the creation of the
first Army course solely focused on the subject of counterinsurgency, known
“Counter-Guerrilla Operations and Tactics,” and conducted at the Special Warfare School
at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. It was the lessons they learned at these schools and in
these manuals, among others, that advisers and soldiers alike would seek to implement as
they shipped out in larger and larger numbers following the election of President John F.
Kennedy. The United States had made significant progress in moving away from their
Eisenhower-era reliance on nuclear weapons and towards Kennedy’s vision of a “flexible
response” strategy, one which allowed the US to respond to a conflict without using
maximum force. However, it was not accepted immediately and, even by the time the US
became combat-oriented in Vietnam, there were still a number of powerful military
positions filled by men who would prioritized eliminating the enemy in a conventional
way rather than “wasting their time” with counterinsurgency tactics.
77 Birtle, COIN, 166-168.
25
The Kennedy Administration
Although neither President John F. Kennedy, nor his predecessor, outrightly
expressed the preservation of a divided Vietnam as a goal of theirs, it did become an
absolute necessity because, if it had been undertaken, the only group that could have
accomplished the reunification was Ho Chi Minh’s Workers Party of Vietnam.78 After
years of French colonial rule, the democratic South Vietnamese had little experience, if
any, in establishing a government and the military forces they did possess had not fought
the Communists alongside the French like they would with the Americans. They would
have been crushed by the battle-hardened forces from the North and, furthermore, only
the Communists had the experience needed to solidify military gains under a strong,
effective, and lasting government. Thus, it was President Kennedy who, in his first year,
“drastically increased U.S. aid to South Vietnam.”79
The efforts undertaken by Kennedy were not a result of the reunification issue
alone, but instead came as a result of the combination of a number of factors, all of which
significantly influenced Kennedy’s decisions. The first of these was the great deal of
importance Kennedy placed on Vietnam itself, which dated back to his senatorial years
and was exemplified by a speech then-Senator Kennedy made in June 1956. In it he
stated that Vietnam “represented ‘a proving ground for democracy in Asia…’ [and] also
represented ‘a test of American responsibility and determination’ there.”80 In the eyes of
Kennedy and his administration, Vietnam came to represent what was to become the
foundation of democracy in Southeast Asia.81 Events much closer to home also
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influenced President Kennedy’s choice to increase American aid to the region. This
included the Bay of Pigs fiasco in mid-April 1961. The complete failure of an
American-backed invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles opposed to Fidel Castro was
especially concerning not only because it was an international embarrassment, but also
because it was, in Kennedy’s eyes, a major and direct defeat. This was due to JFK’s
“zero-sum” outlook towards the Cold War, a viewpoint that equated any kind of success
for Communism anywhere in the world, even if the US had no involvement whatsoever,
as a direct defeat for America.82 This outlook was emphasized when it came to Vietnam
because of Kennedy’s prior struggles in Southeast Asia because he had already failed to
keep another country in the region, Laos, from falling to Communism. He could not let
more of the region fall into that sphere.
The other crucial concept guiding the Kennedy administration, and especially the
president, was a newfound emphasis on the idea of credibility. Both the allies and the
enemies of the United States, even those countries indifferent to and uninvolved with the
ongoing ideological struggle, all needed to know that the US meant what it said and
would do whatever was deemed necessary to uphold its word. If America began shirking
from its dedication to resist Communism by declarations like the Truman Doctrine, its
allies might very well begin to lose trust in the US government and withdraw any of their
own support efforts. The small, “neutral,” usually underdeveloped nations in areas like
southeast Asia were often forced to pick a side or be crushed in between the superpowers
and, if America was seen as untrustworthy by such nations, it was feared they would join
the Communist bloc, a worst-case scenario for the US. On the other hand, if the nation’s
enemies viewed the American government as being unwilling or unable to provide such
82 Hess, Vietnam and the United States, 71.
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resistance efforts, they may become increasingly aggressive in their efforts to expand
their influence around the world. Worse still, they may even become bold enough to act
against the United States more directly. Therefore, Kennedy “considered it essential that
Washington demonstrate the credibility of its commitments [which was] the keystone of
peace in a dangerous and precarious world.”83
The United States government, however, had talked itself into a corner by
routinely emphasizing their determination to confront Communist aggression to such an
extent that a belief arose that “they could not backtrack without jeopardizing the
American government’s credibility and prestige.”84 The emphasis on the country’s
credibility, according to one scholar, had “made disengagement tantamount to
surrendering America’s position of world leadership.”85 These beliefs prompted Kennedy
to implement a program of actions on May 8, 1961, that were deemed necessary to help
the South Vietnamese address their increasing security issues. Military concerns were to
be addressed first by increasing the Military Assistance Advisory Group’s ability and
effectiveness when it came to training South Vietnamese troops, as well as support forces
being sent for the GVN’s (South Vietnam’s) Junk Force in order to prevent the Viet Cong
(VC), communist guerrillas who had remained in the South following the country’s
partition, from accomplishing clandestine infiltration and supply missions into the
country via the rivers. Additional American support would be provided through actions
that included the establishment of a center for the development of new military
techniques to use against Viet Cong forces, assisting in health and public works projects
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for the civilians, and the deployment of a Special Operations group to facilitate the
training of GVN SpecOps teams.86 The United States also sought to provide assistance by
helping create a long-term economic program to inspire confidence in the nation’s future
and by expanding the special operations efforts already being conducted by American
operators.87 Three days later, May 11, 1961, NSAM 52 “reaffirmed the continuing U.S.
commitment to an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam” and provided the
approvals necessary to conduct a somewhat numerous set of actions across America’s
military, psychological, and covert programs.88
Despite the flurry of actions undertaken to help South Vietnam during his first
months in office, President Kennedy and his top advisers were still concerned with the
continued level of Viet Cong activity. Kennedy decided to send a team of high-ranking
officials, representing both military and civil components of the administration, to Saigon
in October 1961 to assess the situation. Led by the State Department’s planning staff
head, Walt W. Rostow, and Kennedy’s military representative, and an expert on flexible
response doctrine, General Maxwell Taylor, the team spent nearly two weeks in-country
while carrying out Kennedy’s one order: to devise “a counterinsurgency plan to stop the
deterioration in South Vietnam.”89 Known as the Taylor-Rostow mission, their report was
completed in early November and advised President Kennedy to send more advisers to
South Vietnam, as well as several battalions of Army engineer, signal, and medical
troops, along with a combat force large enough to protect them.90 The president continued
to refuse assuming an overt combat role in South Vietnam but did approve the
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deployment of yet another round of adviser reinforcements. The Viet Cong insurgency
was flourishing in late 1961 and anything short of deploying combat forces overseas had
to be done to help South Vietnam.91
The Taylor-Rostow report set the stage for “one of the most important decisions
on Vietnam,” the passage of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111 on
November 22, 1961, which substantially increased the number of US advisors in
Vietnam.92 “Project Beefup,” the name given to the process of actually carrying out the
increases called for in NSAM 111, began in late November of 1961 and, by the time the
expansion had been completed in 1962, the amount of assistance being provided to South
Vietnam had more than doubled.93 A more significant effect of Project Beefup, however,
was the organization born out of the need for more effective management of the spike in
American aid to Vietnam. Kennedy’s solution was the establishment of the Military
Assistance Command Vietnam, or MACV, on February 8, 1962. This new headquarters
was “responsible for American military policy, operations, and assistance as well as for
advice to the South Vietnamese on security, organization, and the employment of military
and paramilitary forces,” along with being given control of the inflated advisory
program.94 President Kennedy, who repeatedly refused to send troops to Vietnam himself,
had managed to put nearly everything in place that his successor, President Lyndon B.
Johnson, would need to launch a military campaign just a few years later. However, in the
last weeks of his life, President Kennedy and his administration could only watch as
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years of frustration with the local government boiled over, putting the decades of US aid
and objectives in South Vietnam, and Southeast Asia as a whole, in serious jeopardy.
Ngo Dinh Diem’s Downfall
While the Americans were always determined to uphold their commitment in
South Vietnam, US leadership did have some concerns regarding the strength and
effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and the likelihood of its long-term
success. Most of these questions centered on the ability of South Vietnam’s president,
Ngo Dinh Diem, to gain the public’s support and successfully unify his country. He had
been working to create popular support for his government in the countryside but the
programs he implemented, which promised rural populations a much better lifestyle,
quickly resulted in disappointment.95 Making matters difficult was the Viet Cong
insurgency and their focus on isolating the Diem government from its people both
physically and politically.96 Although the VC had only been around since their
establishment in December 1960, they had already grown into a formidable threat to
survival of the South Vietnamese government.
There were several nation-building programs attempted by Diem but none would
succeed. Each would become an example of the failures associated with the improper
conduct of such campaigns. One of the first was the agroville program, a relocation
program designed to provide protection to peasants by moving them into rural
settlements. It was launched in 1959 but the program’s poor planning and
mismanagement led to its downfall within two years.97 Then, in 1961, a similar campaign
known program was implemented, in which defensible villages were constructed
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throughout the South Vietnamese countryside. Another new component of the Strategic
Hamlet plan was that it involved the relocation of all rural civilians, not just the peasants,
but the problems that hindered the agroville program would also plague this one. The
villagers had been forced to leave almost everything behind and, when the government
began neglecting the hamlets, the villagers felt an even greater sense of alienation and
anger.98
Two other programs were launched in 1963 that hoped to aid in national solidarity
by eliminating the Viet Cong units terrorizing the villages and impeding the government’s
efforts. The programs utilized vastly different, carrot-and-stick methods to achieve their
goals. The first of these, the “carrot” of the two efforts, was known as Chieu Hoi, a
program that granted clemency to any insurgents who laid down their arms and
surrendered.99 The Diem pacification policy’s “stick,” on the other hand, was a series of
organizations that were designed for one sole purpose: the dismantling of the Viet Cong’s
infrastructure, known as the VCI.100 Special elements of South Vietnam’s
newly-established National Police force were tasked with capturing and interrogating
suspected members of the VCI. However, brutal interrogation methods and untrained
staff combined to impede any reforms or progress made towards the collection of
intelligence that was needed to achieve their goals.
American leaders were also concerned with the Diem government’s military
establishment, which was deemed to be weak due to improper training and ineffective
commanders. These concerns were not without cause, and they were best demonstrated at
the Battle of Ap Bac on January 2, 1963. Although the focus of America’s advisory
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program was on training, US advisors would often accompany units on missions to assess
and advise during the planning and execution of those missions. The South Vietnamese
were still in charge of operations, however, and many commanders changed the battle
plan mid-mission and refused to take the adviser’s advice. Ap Bac demonstrated how
several battlefield failures could compound each other and result in shocking defeats
despite holding numerous advantages over the enemy.
Ap Bac was viewed as being “as close to a golden opportunity as there ever was
in Vietnam.”101 When a large Viet Cong force gained control of Ap Bac, American
advisers helped draw up a battle plan that should have resulted in a relatively easy
victory. Three battalions were to be used, one attacking, two from the North and two from
the South, while a company of armored personnel carriers (APCs) assaulted from the
West. The eastern edge of the battlefield was a wide open rice paddy being covered by
aircraft and an airborne battalion, which would be dropped off in the rice paddy if
darkness fell or if otherwise needed.102 The Viet Cong would be, for all intents and
purposes, boxed in. Their only chance of escape would be surviving until nightfall and
using the cover of darkness to sneak through rice paddy’s canals. The South Vietnamese,
however, would possess several tactical advantages such as assaulting by surprise, an
encircled enemy who was unable to escape, a larger force, and better weaponry. Thus, the
idea that any of the VC would manage to escape seemed impossible, much less the
majority of them.
Ap Bac was a stunning failure. The Viet Cong demonstrated a desire and ability to
stand and fight in a big-force engagement, unlike their reliance on hit-and-run tactics in
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the past, but even more significant was the level of incompetence demonstrated by the
South Vietnamese.103 Five ARVN helicopters were shot down by the Viet Cong, two of
which while attempting to aid their downed comrades. Almost nothing else would go
according to the plan. The APC commander ordered his company to stop at the crash
sites to search for and rescue any survivors. Despite the pleading of the accompanying
advisers, he remained there for much of the battle. The battalion to the North, and a
reserve force placed just west of them, were suffering the brunt of the VC’s firepower.
Unable to assault the enemy position due to a lack of cover, they did their best to keep the
VC pinned down. The force to the South, the two battalions whose numbers could
overwhelm the VC position, had halted their advance in the face of enemy fire, allowed
the VC to dig in, and lost the initiative. The final failure, the one that secured the South’s
defeat, was again the result of not following the original plan. The airborne battalion was
called in as it got dark but the South Vietnamese commander overseeing the entire
operation ordered them deployed on the western edge, not in the rice paddy to plug the
gap to the East. Again, the arguments of the American advisers were ignored and, as soon
as darkness fell, the majority of the VC force was able to escape via the rice paddy’s
canals.104
America’s military advisers were furious about the blunder and routinely
complained to their commanding officers of the inability of South Vietnam’s fighting
forces. No adviser was a more vocal critic of Ap Bac than John Paul Vann but many came
to share his attitude towards ARVN forces.105 “Ap Bac epitomized all the deficiencies of
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the system: lack of aggressiveness, hesitancy about taking casualties, lack of battlefield
leadership, a nonexistent chain of command.”106 Under the Diem administration, few
military promotions were based on experience or ability, they were given out as a
political reward or by knowing a top government official. Thus, instead of men with
military and tactical experience leading ARVN operations, they were led by men who
were unqualified and more concerned with the status and benefits brought with being a
commander. As these issues were made apparent, Ap Bac’s most significant outcome was
that it “kindle[d] new doubts in the US about the Diem regime.”107
As the US unsuccessfully suggested reforms for ARVN, events in Saigon a few
months after Ap Bac turned Washington’s doubts to horror. In mid-1963, a protest over
the government’s Buddhist flag ban resulted in the deaths of nine unarmed civilians, and
the beginning of the Buddhist crisis. Despite being the dominant religion in South
Vietnam by far, the Catholic Diem regime had implemented biased policies that favored
Catholic citizens and the violent end to the May 8 protest led to calls for reform. The civil
resistance campaign, led by Buddhist monks, was met by an increasingly oppressive and
violent Diem government and the self-immolation of one monk in Saigon in June that
sparked international outrage and American involvement. The Americans demanded that
Diem end his violent reactions to protests and address the concerns of his Buddhist
citizens, threatening to withdraw aid from the country if he did not, which he ignored,
creating serious animosities in Washington.108 Kennedy and his advisors began
considering the feasibility of replacing Diem while still achieving their desired objectives
in South Vietnam. It was Kennedy’s belief that the only way the war in Vietnam could be
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won was if South Vietnam had a government that was backed by the populace and that
the Diem government had lost much of its popular support in the summer of 1963.109
On November 1 and 2, 1963, South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem, who
had quickly lost popularity and support in South Vietnam and the US, was overthrown by
leaders of the South’s military. Prior to the coup, the American Ambassador in Saigon
was asked by one of its masterminds what the US response would be to such an event.
When Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge asked Washington how he should respond they
replied with the following, “while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish
to leave impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic
and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness
of military effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improving working relations
with U.S.”110 In light of their Cold War ideology and objectives, the US could not appear
to have provided support to either side of a coup in an ostensibly democratic country but,
due to their rising dissatisfaction with Diem’s leadership and cooperation, America was
certainly complicit in his overthrow.
As a result, America was now directly responsible for the government of South
Vietnam but, unfortunately, Kennedy and his advisors “had failed to confront the basic
issues in Vietnam that ultimately led to his overthrow.”111 Making matters worse was the
political vacuum that was left by Diem, as the country was left with few others that had
the requirements to run a country.112 Although the US had gotten rid of an increasingly
authoritarian government, they were left with a situation that looked even more dire than
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before. The position of President of South Vietnam became a revolving door as the
government’s internal instability resulted in nearly ten different men obtaining office after
Diem was assassinated.
Assessment
Although no American troops were in Vietnam yet, the years between World War
II and the end of 1963 would play an important role in US decision making regarding the
conflict in Vietnam. In several interviews with Vietnam-era government and military
members, Gil Dorland sought to understand the thought processes that led the US down
the road to Vietnam. In an interview with John Kerry, a naval officer during the war,
explained that there were a variety of beliefs that led to escalation. In Kerry’s assessment
“there’s hubris; there’s myopia; there’s ignorance; there’s historical ignorance; there’s
Cold War mentality.”113 In a similar interview former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
cited triumphalism, or a feeling of national and/or ideological superiority, as another
important factor.114 In Max Hastings’s analysis, the US’s entire strategy in Vietnam was
based on two false premises, the domino theory and the disposition of Asian
communism.115 “The American crusade, propelled as it was by [containment]... and the
naive assumption that the entire region would collapse to the Communists if they won in
Vietnam, disregarded the complex nationalistic diversity of Southeast Asia.”116
Two slightly different premises formed the foundation for the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations’ thoughts on Vietnam but unfortunately, as then-Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara has pointed out, they proved contradictory. The first of these
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premises was the assumption “that the fall of South Vietnam to Communism would
threaten the security of the United States and the Western world,” meaning the US felt
that it was their duty to protect the free world.117 However, until early 1965, they
performed a significantly restricted role due to the second premise, the belief that “only
the South Vietnamese could defend their nation, and that America should limit its role to
providing training and logistical support.”118 The attitudes and ideas that had led the US
to get involved in Vietnam would continue to influence American leaders in regards to
strategic decisions. The potential loss of a country to Communism was something that the
United States could not overlook thanks to the anti-communist rhetoric and fear that had
become almost second-nature during those twenty years of the Cold War. The idea of
playing a limited role, on the other hand, should have seemed counterintuitive in light of
historical evidence that suggested the need to squash an enemy uprising as soon as
possible using overwhelming force and the American military’s proven ability to do so.
The continued focus on limited roles would prove to be a significant factor in the US
losing a war that almost certainly could have been won.
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Similar to their reasons for intervening, the United States’ objectives in Vietnam
and the strategies they would employ to achieve those objectives, were products “of a
series of trends that had been maturing since World War II.”119 These trends had resulted
in “an all-powerful ‘Cold War consensus’... [that] reigned supreme in American opinion
and dictated that the commitment to South Vietnam had to be maintained, through major
military escalation if necessary.”120 The way the US went about maintaining their
commitment, however, would come back to haunt them. The roots of America’s failure to
capitalize on their military advantages and win a very “winnable” war can be found in the
Johnson administration's strategy formation.
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1964: Rise of “Gradual Pressure”
The American commitment under President Lyndon B. Johnson was focused on
achieving one overarching objective, “the independence of South Vietnam, its freedom
from attack, and a stable, democratic government in the South.”121 According to National
Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, published on March 17, 1964, nothing short
of that objective could be considered a victory.122 It was not until December 1964 that the
US expressed any semblance of a plan for achieving that victory, one which utilized
reprisal actions and was referred to as “gradual escalation.”123 The foundational attitudes
and ideas of such a plan, however, were flawed and resulted in an unbelievably weak
attempt to achieve an objective that had been at the heart of decades of struggle. The
result of such a half-hearted attempt at success is conveyed plainly and accurately in H.
R. McMaster’s conclusion that “the war in Vietnam was not lost in the field… It was lost
in Washington, D.C.”124
This idea of “graduated pressure” was first championed by Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara in mid-1964. In his conception of the strategy, the US would
gradually increase its use of force as a way to communicate with the North Vietnamese, a
way to “convey American resolve and thereby convince… [them] to alter [their]
behavior.”125 It also allowed the US to act without having to immediately choose one
extreme, invading Vietnam, or the other, withdrawing completely. This was the
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“intellectual foundation for deepening American involvement in Vietnam” but the
problem with this foundation was that it “had been laid without the participation of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS].”126 The group of men tasked with formulating and advising
the President on the best military strategy available for a situation had been effectively
shut out of the decision making process.
The fact that the JCS was shut out of the war’s decision making processes from
the beginning was an example of the hierarchical structure that President Johnson
operated in. “The final decisions on important matters of foreign policy were made by a
small group of top officials,”127 argued historian Doris Kearns Goodwin. This kind of
decision-making structure significantly increased the influence of those in Johnson’s
“inner circle” while also reducing the likelihood and significance of any dissent by those
below them. Being outside the circle even impeded one’s ability to create or present a
coherent argument or alternative to a decision because they did not have access to certain
information that may be crucial to their idea. Before long, “the structure of
decision-making had become so narrowed that Lyndon Johnson received the advice of
only five or six men, consulting the National Security Council, the Congress, and the
Cabinet only after the decision had been made.”128 This meant that the president was
making wartime decisions based off the advice given by the same handful of men, some
of whom were offering advice on topics that fell outside their realms of expertise and
therefore had no business advising the president on. To make matters worse, the actual
experts on most of the topics discussed were not even made aware of it until after the
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decision  was settled upon, allowing the authority on that particular topic, such as the JCS
when it came to undertaking military options, no opportunity to voice any of their
expertise. This would contribute significantly to the government’s failure to correctly
utilize all of the factors it possessed that could have won the war.
Another key factor in this exclusionary environment was Secretary McNamara,
the adviser that Johnson trusted most when it came to Vietnam.129 Unfortunately,
McNamara had a habit of overselling things to the president, like the near-certain success
of his graduated force plan, despite warnings from more knowledgeable officials, in this
case the Joint Chiefs, “that his program would be insufficient to ‘turn the tide’ against the
Viet Cong.”130 However, there were several other factors that made President Johnson
listen to McNamara more than others. The first of these was Johnson’s knowledge that
McNamara’s “loyalty was unwavering, and [his]  goals were consistent with
[Johnson’s].”131 This trustworthiness facilitated the development of the strongest bonds of
affection and mutual respect between the two men. Their bond ran so deep that the
President “often asked for [McNamara’s] advice and assistance on matters outside the
secretary of defense’s jurisdiction.”132 Such a relationship could prove problematic to
winning the war if and when McNamara provided incorrect advice or an inadequate plan,
or if McNamara was arguing against someone who was suggesting something that was
ultimately a better option, because McNamara was the president’s most trusted advisor
and it was apparent that he valued trustworthiness over expertise in the decision-making
process on Vietnam.
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1965: America on the Offensive
In early February 1965, Communist forces launched two surprise attacks against
US bases at Pleiku and Quinhon, resulting in rather significant damage and American
casualties. These attacks also resulted in the rise of two other men who would become
influential advocates for a strategy of graduated pressure. The first was National Security
Advisor McGeorge Bundy who, on February 7, sent President Johnson a memorandum
titled “The Situation in South Vietnam.” In it he provided the justification for applying
mounting pressure to the enemy: begin with reprisal attacks in response to “specific VC
attacks but gradually escalate into sustained attacks,” thus pressuring the North
Vietnamese to stop supporting the Viet Cong and, hopefully, force the North to agree to
terms of surrender with the US.133 The American Ambassador to the Republic of
Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor, added a critical component to the American strategy on
February 12 when he sent a message to Washington, D.C., containing the specific
objectives graduated pressure was to accomplish. In order of importance, these objectives
were: “(1) to affect the will of Hanoi; (2) to bolster GVN morale; and (3) to physically
damage the DRV and thereby reduce its ability to support the VC.”134 The strategy
seemed to be further verified by an intelligence report on February 18, 1965, designated
Special National Intelligence Estimate, or SNIE, 10-3/1-65. Intelligence analysts reported
that, as American attacks continuously became more sustained, the North Vietnamese
“would probably… seek a respite rather than to intensify the struggle in the South.”135
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The administration decided the best way to begin flexing their muscle was
through the air, and an American bombing mission was directed to take out an enemy
barracks in retaliation. This mission was, as had been suggested by Bundy, linked to the
Pleiku attack. The Johnson administration also took advantage of the reprisal opportunity
provided by the attack on Quinhon but, rather than linking the reprisal specifically to the
VC’s Quinhon attack, it was just one of a number of incidents that were provided as the
justification for the US’s bombing of two more enemy barracks.136 Thus, the US was
already beginning to make the transition from specific retaliations to sustained attack
missions. Shortly after the process had begun, the first mission of the Rolling Thunder
campaign was underway. The bombing operation would span three-and-a-half years,
from its first day on March 2, 1965, to the beginning of November 1968, during which
time the missions grew in terms of the number of sorties flown and the number of targets
and the time in between the sorties shortened.
President Johnson, like his predecessors, stuck to a policy of doing just enough to
save South Vietnam from defeat without doing much more so as not to upset Americans
at home or prompt the intervention of the Soviet and/or Chinese allies of North Vietnam.
This created a problem, however, as more and more American aircraft and personnel
were sent to Vietnam. The South Vietnamese did not have the manpower, nor the skill, to
adequately protect the numerous air bases that housed the planes and their crews and,
since these were both inviting targets for the enemy, proper security could only be
provided by the presence of American troops. In 1965, decision makers chose to deploy
two Marine battalions overseas to provide air base security and, keeping with the
reaction-based graduated pressure strategy, ordered them to remain within the base. The
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use of force was only permitted if the Marines found themselves and their base under
attack. Still, these Marines were certainly better than nothing, recalled the commander of
the US’s Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), General William
Westmoreland. Had they “not committed American troops, it was just a matter of time till
[the South Vietnamese] disintegrated.”137 It soon became clear, however, that the strategy
of gradually applying military force would create its own set of problems, even for the
world’s superpower, the United States.
On April 6, 1965, just over a month after the Marines had landed in Vietnam,
there was a significant change in US strategy. NSAM 328 approved the deployment of
two additional Marine battalions and one Marine air squadron, along with another 18,000
to 20,000 to serve as reinforcements and logistics personnel.138 More importantly, the
original “defense-only” mission was replaced with orders that allowed US forces to take
a more active role in combat.139 Ambassador Taylor, formerly the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and General Westmoreland had quickly come to agree on a three-stage
ground strategy in response to the influx of troops. After securing a base area during
stage one, American troops would conduct offensive operations and deep patrols in
support of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), and then would transition
to the third stage, which consisted of search and destroy missions and reactionary
operations.140 However, the strategy was doomed from the start due to several inherent
issues that would continue to plague the US war effort.
140 Pentagon Papers, “[Part IV. C. 5.] Evolution of the War. Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces: March -
July 1965,” 23.
139 LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, “Memorandum # 328,”
https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/nsf-nsam328.
138 LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, “Memorandum # 328, Presidential Decisions with Respect to
Vietnam, 4/6/1965,” Online Digital Archive, DiscoverLBJ, https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/nsf-nsam328.
137 Laura Palmer, “The General at Ease: An Interview with William C. Westmoreland,” in The Cold War,
ed. Robert Cowley (New York: Random House, 2005), 315.
45
The troop increase and “green light” for offensive operations had been the
Johnson administration’s newest attempt to force a “settlement by demonstrating to the
VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning.”141 The roughly twenty-five thousand
troops sent into Vietnam between March and May were seen as a necessary contribution
to the safety of South Vietnam but they worried that sending in any more than that would
be overly provocative.142 Had the RVNAF been adequately manned, equipped, and
trained to deal with the type of enemy they faced, the  twenty-five thousand American
supporting cast might have been enough, but the US either were unaware of, or
neglected, the fact that the RVNAF was none of these. Therefore, the US did not have the
manpower it needed to conduct substantial and hard-hitting operations necessary to
defeat their enemy but, at the time, achieving that objective looked slim since “the VC
are winning now - largely because the ratio of guerrilla to anti-guerrilla forces is
unfavorable to the government.”143 A dangerous trend was beginning to appear in
America’s strategic decisions: the initial objective of a democratic South Vietnam, “under
the leadership of Lyndon Johnson… became one of stalemate based on the
administration’s unwillingness to commit the level of force necessary to impose a
solution consistent with U.S. interests.”144 Yet, by the middle of the 1960s, the US found
itself committed to an all-out war for South Vietnam.145
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1965-1968: The Impact of William Westmoreland
General William Westmoreland was placed in charge in Vietnam in the middle of
1964 and he quickly obtained significant influence on the conduct of the war.”146 As the
head of MACV, Westmoreland was the one who “formalized the strategic views that
would guide American troop employment for the next three years.”147 He wanted to have
a strategy that balanced several crucial objectives when it came to counterinsurgency
warfare, such as detecting and intercepting enemy reinforcements and supplies that easily
passed through the porous borders of South Vietnam. Westmoreland used American-led
units of South Vietnamese irregulars to patrol these regions while he based most of his
troops near the coast and around Saigon, locations from which they “would be positioned
to protect the South Vietnamese people from attack and to isolate the guerrillas from the
majority of the nation's resources.”148 These areas also served as the launching points for
American offensive operations designed to destroy and push back Communist forces.
Such efforts provided a “security blanket” of sorts for the South Vietnamese forces,
which were tasked with “the internal war-fighting village guerrillas, establishing control
over the nation's population and resources, and building new social institutions capable of
withstanding the Communist onslaught.”149
With these objectives in mind, Westmoreland issued a new three-phase plan for
fighting the war on August 30, 1965, Phase I, lasting through the remainder of 1965,
focused on “the commitment of forces ‘necessary to halt the losing trend.’” The second
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phase would start with the new year and aimed at resuming the offensive, destroying
enemy forces, and allowing pacification operations to expand, followed by Phase III, a
twelve to eighteen-month push to achieve “the final ‘defeat and destruction of remaining
enemy forces and base areas.’”150 Simply put, this was going to be a war of attrition, or “a
military strategy… [focused on] wearing down or grinding down the enemy until the
enemy lost its will to fight or the capacity to sustain its military effort.”151 The indicator
of success was measured by body counts but it was difficult to severely weaken an enemy
force that avoided pitched battles and used hit-and-run tactics instead. American forces
would have to search for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops down themselves if
they wanted any chance at wiping out large numbers at once.
The attrition strategy had been based on the belief “that, if he could inflict
sufficient casualties on the enemy, they would cease their aggression against South
Vietnam.”152 It seemed only logical to Westmoreland that the North would have to
surrender if the US could reach their “crossover point,” or the point at which casualties
occurred faster and at a higher rate than reinforcements could be deployed, an idea dating
back to World War II. Reaching it “became the principal military goal for the next two
years.”153 There were a few methods for trying to reach the crossover point, one of which
was to take the fight to the enemy with search and destroy missions. These types of
missions were “a series of large unit sweeps… frequently conducted in the deep jungle
regions next to South Vietnam’s western borders with Laos and Cambodia, designed to
seek out enemy forces and engage them in decisive battle.”154 These missions relied on
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mobility, utilizing airmobile divisions that were airlifted into an area on helicopters, but
also relied on “firepower to wear down the enemy by attrition at minimal cost in U.S.
lives.”155 Such operations “would dominate U.S. actions in 1966, causing body counts, at
least for a time, to dominate MACV’s evaluation and reporting systems.”156 The other
two types of operations crafted by Westmoreland, used much less frequently, were still
important to achieving his objectives. One was the “clear and hold” operation, during
which the subject area would be near-continuously patrolled by US forces until the
enemy had been pushed out and the area deemed safe for pacification efforts. Finally
there were “securing” operations that were similar to clear and hold missions, except for
when an area was deemed safe, at which point control was gradually passed to South
Vietnamese paramilitary and police forces.157
1966: America Goes on the Offensive
Strategic policies remained almost untouched into mid-1966 as American leaders,
both civil and military, had a bad habit of neglecting strategy reassessments until it was
too late. This had been largely due to the leadership’s neglect of anything that suggested
their policies were flawed or incorrect. Ironically, the assessment conducted in 1966,
which should have cleared up concerns about strategic priorities and shifted US strategy
in the right direction, seemed to be misunderstood by most of those who had the power to
demand changes. In March 1966 General Harold K. Johnson, the US Army’s Chief of
Staff, commissioned a study on Army policy in Vietnam that provided both critiques and
suggestions on how to improve on the problem areas. Entitled “A Program for the
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” better known as PROVN,
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it began with a rather straightforward assessment that the “hearts and minds” aspect of
the war was most important to victory and that the reaffirmation of “Rural Construction
[pacification] as the foremost US–GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN
influence” was needed immediately.158 Throughout much of the report, its authors
“expressed concern that the United States was not doing enough to win the allegiance of
the Vietnamese people,” and suggested various strategies to adequately address the
issues.159
Unfortunately, however, what most military officials seemed to focus on was the
acknowledgement that “Rural Construction can progress significantly only in conjunction
with the effective neutralization of major enemy forces.”160 The authors stressed that only
a fraction of American personnel should be used to guard civilians while the majority of
US forces should be focused on exerting “unrelenting pressure… upon… major enemy
combat forces” since their primary role “was ‘to isolate the battlefield by curtailing
significant infiltration, demolishing the key war zones, and fully engaging PAVN-main
force VC units.’” PROVN’s assessment seemed to justify the strategy Westmoreland had
chosen to implement. The fear of widening the war, thereby bringing China and/or the
Soviet Union into the conflict, proved to be a significant influence on strategy formation
and critically impeded the US military’s ability to isolate the battlefield. Civilian
policymakers refused to allow sanctuary-clearing, cross-border operations into Laos and
southern North Vietnam, a decision that arguably cost them the war. The enemy could
essentially come and go as it pleased in South Vietnam, and supply lines were constantly
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being utilized. Therefore, the US was never able to isolate the battlefield and quickly
eliminate large North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units.161
Despite the continued focus on attrition and body counts, PROVN did manage to
bring the “other war” back towards the front of General Westmoreland’s mind and, a few
months later, there was a shift in strategic emphasis. On August 26, 1966, Westmoreland
sent a cable to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) detailing his
operational plan from mid-1966 to mid-1977. Between May 1, 1966 and November 1 of
that year, Westmoreland’s strategic focus had been mounting a tactical operation against
Communist forces but shifted to a general offensive between November 1, 1966 and May
1, 1967 in order to provide “maximum practical support to area and population security
in further support of revolutionary development.”162 American military strategy in
late-1966 and early 1967 clearly placed more emphasis on pacification and large numbers
of American battalions would be involved, but the focus on main force combat was never
totally replaced.163
1967 and 1968: Pacification Efforts and the Tet Offensive
The growing emphasis on pacification, or gaining the support of the South
Vietnamese peasantry, continued as 1966 drew to a close. On November 7, MACV and
the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS), the South Vietnamese version of the US’s Joint
Chiefs of Staff, issued AB 142, Combined Campaign Plan, 1967.164 This document set
forth the joint US-RVNAF campaign plan for 1967 and it placed an increased emphasis
on joint pacification efforts than before. The US government was also paying increased
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attention to pacification efforts and looked to facilitate their success by eliminating as
much of the interagency friction created by these efforts as possible. On May 9, 1967,
NSAM 362 was issued, creating the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support office, uniting all pacification efforts under MACV.165 Under the management of
Robert Komer, designated the Deputy for Pacification to the Commander US Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), the office combined the civil and
military pacification efforts from both the US and South Vietnam into one structure. This
greatly increased the cooperation between agencies and countries when it came to
revolutionary development and it had positive effects on the success of the overall
program. The details of pacification will be discussed in a subsequent chapter but these
shifts in strategic emphasis marked rather significant occurrences.
President Johnson’s final year in office, 1968, also saw the end of General
Westmoreland’s MACV command. In June 1968, he left Vietnam for Washington D.C. to
serve as the Chief of Staff of the US Army and had been replaced as COMUSMACV by
General Creighton W. Abrams. Although Westmoreland had begun paying more attention
to the pacification element of the Vietnam War, Abrams had already been a heavy
proponent of pacification’s value and seemed to be much more successful at promoting
that emphasis throughout the ranks. He championed “the notion that the conflict in
Vietnam should be treated as “one war, in which military and pacification operations
blended into a seamless tapestry.” Soon nearly every unit in the Army was showing
greater concern for pacification security and/or support missions compared to the
previous three years. Part of this increased concern was a response to the Tet Offensive,
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after which the US scrambled to take advantage of the massive losses suffered by their
Communist foes and secure as much of South Vietnam as possible. It also helped that the
new MACV Commander, General Abrams, was much more vocal proponent of
pacification-focused efforts. However, “Abrams’ one-war campaign differed from
Westmoreland’s activities more in emphasis than in substance.”166
1964-1968: A Strategic Assessment
Andrew J. Birtle’s conclusion that “in Vietnam, America’s most egregious errors
lay in the realms of policy and strategy rather than military doctrine” is a near spot on
assessment of what led to the US defeat in the Vietnam War.167 To be even more specific,
the worst errors were almost entirely the result of policy and strategy decisions made by
America’s civilian leaders. The problems began with President Johnson’s “middle of the
road” responses to nearly any war-related concern. Johnson “did not ‘define a clear
military mission for the military,’” leaving the advisors, members of covert operation
teams, pilots, and all other military personnel in Vietnam unsure of what objective they
should focus on working towards.168 As a result, almost a year of advisory efforts and
covert activities between November 1963 and the end of 1964 were wasted on activities
that, in reality, did relatively nothing to combat their Communist enemy.
When Washington did, in fact, make a meaningful decision, it seemed to impede
the efforts of the American military more than help, an argument that General
Westmoreland had fervently espoused since the end of the war.169 There were many
officers, in fact, that argued “that the United States could have achieved a quick and
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decisive victory in Indochina, if only the pusillanimous civilian policymakers of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations had not ‘tied the hands’ of the U.S. military and
‘denied it permission to win.’”170 It was the inherently noncommittal graduated response
strategy that handcuffed the armed forces, effectively denying the world’s strongest
military the chance to unleash that strength “quickly, decisively, and without limit,” a
scenario that would have actually produced the desired results, if not an outright
victory.171 This was due to the other major fault of America’s civilian leadership: the
entirely incorrect assumption that allowing the war to widen, even slightly, would result
in Chinese and/or Soviet intervention on behalf of the North Vietnamese. According to
General Alexander Haig, these fears were totally unfounded, “a reflection of a total lack
of strategic intelligence,” and a result of paranoia.172
By choosing to escalate gradually, and oftentimes attacking only out of retaliation,
the government “was in effect relinquishing the initiative to the other side” while also
failing to demonstrate “that force, once applied, would be used as a precise and
discriminating instrument of policy.”173 Instead of forcing the North Vietnamese to
surrender, the strategy’s intended effect, it created the kind of long, inconclusive,
attrition-based conflict that best suited the Vietnamese Communists.174 It was not until
mid-1965, when General Westmoreland was given the go-ahead to begin conducting
combat operations on the ground, that the US was able to make any kind of headway
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against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. There have been many critiques of
Westmoreland’s search and destroy tactics, and it was by no means the perfect solution,
yet it allowed the US to finally take the initiative and take the fight to the Communists,
but only to an extent. American ground forces were not allowed to leave South Vietnam,
due to the fear about expanding the war, which allowed the major Communist sanctuaries
and supply routes located in Laos and just across the DMZ to remain untouched by
American firepower. This gave the enemy areas they could retreat to, rest and regroup in,
and then resupply before launching another assault into South Vietnam. The Johnson
administration’s refusal to allow cross-border missions was a critical mistake because it
made it nearly impossible for Westmoreland to achieve his objective of destroying enemy
forces. The survival of the enemy sanctuaries just across South Vietnam’s borders also
contributed to the security concerns involved with pacification because VC and NVA
forces could wait out American sweeps in safety then reinfiltrate those “cleared” areas
behind US forces. It was a never-ending cycle that could only have been remedied by
allowing cross-border search and destroy missions in which the US could bring its far
superior firepower down upon their enemy, their major bases, and a large amount of
supplies. Although such actions would not bring about an immediate end to the war, but it
would have allowed for the total destruction of main enemy forces, significantly
improving security concerns in South Vietnam, thereby facilitating the pacification
efforts.
Although America’s civilian leadership deserves much of the blame for creating
and implementing a strategy as faulty as gradual escalation, it would be unfair and
inaccurate to lay it all at their feet. There are some members of the military leadership
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that should be held accountable as well. For instance, the members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff failed to do their most important job as the nation’s top military advisers: providing
the president with the most accurate advice possible when it came to military
decisionmaking. They all believed a graduated pressure strategy was fundamentally
flawed but none of them offered any real challenge to the assumptions that the strategy
was based on.175 Furthermore, none of them even bothered to come up with a viable
strategic alternative, instead choosing to remain silent as the nation’s military was
incorrectly implemented. The JCS shoulder some blame for losing a winnable war
because they failed to do their duty, plain and simple, and the nation and its military
suffered for it. However, few Americans knew these men because they were rarely in the
national spotlight and, unfortunately, those who did not know any better found others to
blame instead.
When it came to the military, most people found it much easier to blame the war’s
most easily recognizable military leader, General Westmoreland. It had been his face they
saw on their TVs at night, and he was the commander of MACV, so it was only natural
for people to associate Westmoreland with the military’s top brass. However, many
seemed to forget that, despite being a general himself and serving as the Commander of
MACV, he was not actually the “top man” that might have come across through media
portrayals. The perception that the “buck stopped with him” when it came to making
decisions about the war resulted in years of criticism from those who blamed him for
American failures in Vietnam. Westmoreland certainly was not perfect, he made
mistakes, but arguments like Sorley’s, that Westmoreland wasted the war’s first four
175 Dorland, Legacy of Discord, 180.
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years, squandered whatever support Americans had initially, and essentially started the
country down its path from stalemate to defeat, are overly harsh.176
The criticism surrounding Westmoreland focused on his choice to undertake a war
of attrition. The strategy’s core idea, and one of its major defects, was its assumption that
the US could inflict intolerable losses upon their enemy.177 However, “‘if the United
States ground troops could not “find” the enemy or “fix” him… they manifestly could not
“fight” or “finish” him… and the United States could never do it.’”178 Further
complicating the objective was the simultaneous concern with keeping the number of
American deaths within acceptable limits, which completely contradicted both the
lessons learned from previous conflicts in Asia and the reality of the situation in
Vietnam.179 The US relied heavily on its superior firepower but its incorrect utilization
created the significant, if unintended, issue of undermining of the pacification program
and creation of South Vietnamese animosity towards the US and GVN forces.180
American troops were shocked to find out that, despite their destructive capabilities,
Communist forces maintained control of the war but, in reality, Communist control was
aided by the US’s destructiveness, and the animosity it created in civilians.181
There have been numerous critiques regarding Westmoreland’s tactical decisions
as well, namely the commonly used search and destroy mission. Complaints about these
missions were common, even among high-ranking officers like General Alexander Haig,
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who compared the missions to a deranged, bloody version of hide-and-seek, while more
light-hearted comparisons included likening the missions to being unable to register a hit
during a game of Whack-a-Mole game.182 Early search and destroy missions were
assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade and their commander, Brigadier General Ellis
Williamson, described having to run around jungles without a true target as being
energy-wasting, often ineffective operations.183 Ignored by America’s military leadership
while they ordered forces to hunt down and kill the enemy was the importance of
controlling an area and completely securing it, especially against an enemy of primarily
guerrilla forces.184
Eliminating enemy troops was important in warfare but this had already proven
difficult, due to the enemy’s reluctance to stand their ground and fight against larger
American units with superior firepower.185 Instead of walking aimlessly and always being
virtually one step away from a enemy ambush, the Army should have sent the large,
multi-battalion search and destroy units into designated areas to clear and gain control of
them. Then, one or two of the unit’s battalions could conduct small-unit search and
destroy missions to remove any enemy forces in the vicinity while the other battalion(s)
could remain in the originally designated area to provide security and prevent the
enemy’s re-infiltration. A similar tactic, discussed in greater detail in a later chapter, was
used rather successfully by the Marine Corps during their time in Vietnam. After securing
the main area of focus, a village for instance, smaller detachments of the overall unit
could be sent on short recon patrols or search and destroy missions while another
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detachment remained in the original target area as a security force to prevent the enemy
from reentering the area. This provided a “best of both worlds” approach that facilitated
securing an area to protect it from enemy control and/or operations while also providing
the opportunity to conduct offensive operations and take the fight to any nearby enemy
forces to further destroy and repel them. The more secure the area was, the greater the
chance for pacification’s success. It was military success against enemy forces, combined
with security and pacification efforts that removed the Communist infrastructure from its
social networks, that provided the best chance of winning the war.
Westmoreland's strategic decisions were the subject of several government
studies, with one of the most effective critical analyses coming from the Office of
Systems Analysis, located within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Published by Dr. Alain Enthoven, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems
Analysis, and his coauthor K. Wayne Smith, the report faulted Westmoreland for fighting
the war in a way that wasted resources on operations with a high-cost and low pay-off, as
well as for being unable to make any real dent in enemy troop numbers, mainly because
the enemy replaced their casualties almost daily.186 Further impeding the US’s efforts to
destroy the enemy was the measure of control the VC possessed over their losses, simply
by controlling the pace of action.187 Westmoreland also failed in two crucial, interrelated,
security-based war concerns of the war. By neglecting pacification and the upgrade
program for the South Vietnamese military, Westmoreland had failed to provide for either
civilian security or the RVNAF’s self-defense ability.188
188 Sorley, Westmoreland, 107.
187 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 82.
186 Sorley, Westmoreland, 107.
59
Westmoreland’s strategy, which he had predicted would take off in 1966 and
result in America’s victory by the end of 1967, had failed and, according to Enthoven, the
had “‘reached a stalemate at a high commitment.’”189 This was the exemplified by the
fact that Westmoreland had been unable to make use of an immense military buildup that
took place the first three years of the war which had included 500,000 troops, 1.2 million
tons of bombs, and 400,000 attack sorties (aircraft attack missions), and contributed to
200,000 enemies killed in action. Despite the massive military might that he was
provided with, 20,000 Americans had been killed and there had been little progress made
in regards to Allied control over the countryside or the defense of urban areas.190
There was one operational decision for which Westmoreland was solely
responsible, one that seemed somewhat irrelevant at the time, but turned out to be rather
significant due to the struggles it created. As the troops flooded into South Vietnam
during the build up, the seemingly basic and administrative question of tour length was
brought up and Westmoreland decided that it should be on one year. He believed that
there was no “alternative because of considerations of morale, and the necessity of
sharing the burden of the war.”191 After one year, the now-experienced troops were
replaced with fresh-faced, untested, and inexperienced replacements who filled numerous
roles, from average grunt to unit commanders, and it became clear that the one-year tours
of duty would be yet another source of concern for military leadership during the
Vietnam War.
In an interview with the Washington Post, General Westmoreland would admit
that “the turnover of personnel that has evolved from the one-year tour has been our
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greatest liability.”192 For starters, one-year tours were operationally corrosive because it
resulted in “few really experienced American field soldiers.”193 Furthermore, the Army’s
policies for rotating its personnel almost never provided the time or the opportunity for
the outgoing troops to share any valuable lessons or unit analysis with the new guys.194
This information from battle-tested troops would have been immensely helpful for the
fresh arrivals, most of whom were teenagers that had only recently finished their basic
training. At the very least, such conversations would have helped prepare the new troops
for their time in Vietnam and, more importantly, might have saved at least a few
American lives. “‘The 12-month rotation policy… touted for its benefits provided to the
individual soldier, seems in fact to have been a significant element in causing greater
numbers of men to lose their lives and may have increased neuropsychiatric
casualties.’”195
As for the operational impacts of the one-year tour policy, staff officers would
often explain that personnel turbulence was the greatest effect, that its shudder could be
felt up and down the Army, but that it “had a decided adverse impact upon units, missions
and individuals.”196 The lack of truly experienced Americans in the field had a corrosive
impact on operations, especially when it came to advisory and pacification efforts since
none of the new soldiers understood the social and/or cultural aspects that were so crucial
to the success of these kinds of missions.197 It could take the new soldier weeks just to
earn the trust and cooperation of the RVNAF officials they were ordered to work with,
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with no guarantee of ever earning those sentiments, but either way it was a serious and
recurring impediment to succeeding in the joint efforts to secure the countryside and
prepare South Vietnamese forces for independent fighting. The biggest operational
impediment posed by the one-year tour was also its most tragic: the increased death rates
of soldiers just beginning their tour.
Closely related to this was the higher death rates for troops under new unit
commanders, many of whom served surprisingly short combat command tours. The
officers in these positions, generally considered career military personnel who needed
combat command experience for their career development and promotions, were
oftentimes replaced around the six-month mark. This allowed the officer to get the
“experience” he needed for a promotion but their actual inexperience from such a short
rotation program was paid for with the lives of the men they led. For instance, the
average length of a maneuver battalion commander was 5.6 months, but the battalions
with a commander with more than six months experience only suffered two-thirds of the
losses suffered by a battalion with a commander having less than six months experience.
In a company, the average command was four months, which proved to be extremely
dangerous for both the new commander and his troops. Four percent of company
commanding officers were killed during their first four months in combat while only
two-and-a-half percent were killed after four months, a two-thirds drop in their death
rate.198 Furthermore, the average number of US troops killed in action dropped by
twenty-five percent in a company with a commander that possessed more than four
198 Baritz, Backfire, 308.
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months of experience when compared to a company commander with under four months
experience.199
Conclusions
The faulty strategic concepts had ruined a stretch of approximately three years
that represented the best chance the United States had to win the Vietnam War. General
Westmoreland, the commander of MACV, certainly deserves some of the blame for his
part in the implementation of incorrect strategic objectives and operations. His one-year
tour of duty decision, designed to protect his troops by boosting their morale and sharing
the war’s burden on them, was, in reality,  clearly detrimental to America’s ability to
carry out the war effort and should have been changed when its drawbacks were
discovered. The security and pacification efforts did not receive the attention they should
have early on, but the changes made in 1966 and 1967 were steps in the right direction.
Westmoreland’s decision to pursue a war of attrition and to utilize large-unit search and
destroy missions did encounter problems but they were a strong foundation for success.
They did, after all, more productive than the graduated escalation strategy that had been
employed by those in the American government.
General Westmoreland’s strategies and tactics may have needed adjustment, but
they did allow the US to seize the initiative for a time, and facilitated operations that
demonstrated the feasibility of military success between 1965 and 1968. In reality, the
strategic faults that inhibited US military operations, led to a stalemate, and ended with
America’s defeat in Vietnam were not created by military men, they were created by
President Johnson and a handful of his closest civil advisers, then forced on the military.
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When it came to his Vietnam strategy, President Lyndon B. Johnson spent the first nine
months of his presidency following in the footsteps of John F. Kennedy. He “armored
himself with… the still unfulfilled goals of the Kennedy administration,” which allowed
Johnson to argue “that his call to continue was in effect John Kennedy’s call.”200
Like his predecessor, Johnson adhered to a plan of taking action only when it was
absolutely necessary, and even then only choosing the “middle of the road” option.
President Johnson also chose to follow Kennedy’s graduated pressure policy,
which failed as a viable military strategy and did not accomplish anything during those
first months of the war. Graduated pressure was, in reality, just another name for a limited
war, a war in which restrictions were placed on its objectives and scope, but not
necessarily on its commitment. It was not until Westmoreland drafted and implemented
his three phase plan in 1965 that the US had a clear, definable objective and a strategy
capable of producing success in combat. Still, the US military continued to be handcuffed
by graduated pressure strategies and outlawed operations, like the cross-border missions
to wipe out enemy sanctuaries. Had they been unrestrained and “turned loose,” they
almost certainly could have built on momentum from successful operations, like those
discussed in the next chapter, and turned it into a full offensive against enemy forces
which, more than likely, would result in military victory.




President Lyndon B. Johnson had been propelled into the executive office
suddenly in November 1963 following President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in
Dallas, Texas. Although he was now in control, he intended to continue Kennedy’s
Vietnam policies, attempting to avoid further escalation while still providing South
Vietnamese with the support necessary to defeat the Communist forces that threatened
them. Unfortunately for Johnson, South Vietnam had become increasingly unstable
politically since the ousting of President Ngo Dinh Diem on November 1 and 2, 1963.
Coups had become commonplace and there would be eight more regime changes by the
time President Johnson left office in January 1969.201 By early 1964, President Johnson
looked to strengthen the South Vietnamese and demonstrate American resilience to the
North Vietnamese by, once again, following in the footsteps of President Kennedy,
specifically his administration’s NSAM 52, which had approved minor covert operations
in May 1961.202
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However, when the Johnson administration’s covert action plan failed, America’s leaders
realized they could either continue their policies that had achieved no progress, adopt a
“fast squeeze” approach that involved rapidly-applied military pressures, or adopt a
“progressive squeeze-and-talk” approach that allowed them to increase or decrease the
level of pressure on the North Vietnamese as they deemed fit.203 It was the choice to
follow this third approach, known as “gradual escalation,” that would critically hamstring
the operations of a military that otherwise would have more than likely won the war.
1964: Retaliatory Actions
The Johnson administration, in an effort to achieve its two main goals, developed
Operational Plan (OPLAN) 34A in February 1964. The Navy’s task was to sail missions
along the Vietnamese coast and gather intelligence about the air defense capabilities of
the North Vietnamese. Officially known as DEHAVEN Special Operations off TsingtaO
(DESOTO) patrols, the missions “were part of a system of global electronic
reconnaissance carried out by specially equipped U.S. naval vessels.”204 They legally
operated in international waters eleven miles off the coast but, on August 2, 1964, North
Vietnamese gunboats attacked an American destroyer, the USS Maddox, engaging in one
of these missions. After a short firefight in which the Communists were repelled, the
Maddox concluded its patrol. Two days later the Maddox again reported being under
attack, along with the destroyer USS Turner Joy and, “although doubts subsequently
developed… as to whether this second alleged attack actually took place, the
administration seized the opportunity to retaliate.”205 The foundation for the
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Americanization of the war in Vietnam was significantly strengthened by the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution. Passed on August 7, 1964, it “authorized LBJ to take ‘all necessary
measures’ to resist aggression in Vietnam.” 206 Johnson used the resolution like a
declaration of war and quickly began to authorize a massive US military expansion in
Vietnam.
Instead of halting the patrols after the attacks, Johnson instructed the Navy not
only to continue them but to do so with an extra destroyer to each mission along with
combat air patrol for added protection. He concluded by issuing orders “to the
commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers, (a) to attack any force which
attacks them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective not only of
driving off the force but of destroying it.’”207 His orders formed the basis for NSAM 314,
published on September 10, 1964. It stated that the patrols would “operate initially well
beyond the 12-mile limit… comprise two to three destroyers and would have air cover
from carriers; the destroyers will have their own ASW [anti-submarine warfare]
capability.”208 With the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and NSAM 314, the US Navy was
beginning its transition from a non-combat advisory and intelligence-gathering role to a
combat role. As the frequency of the DESOTO patrols increased, and they included a
greater contingent of combat-ready forces, the Navy transitioned away from their
advisory role and became increasingly combat-oriented, but the changes did not stop
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there. American air power would become critical in responding to what happened in the
gulf.
Like their ground and naval counterparts, US Air Force advisors worked to
provide their South Vietnamese counterparts with strategic and operational advice. For
instance, some American pilots sent to advise the South Vietnamese Air Force served as
copilots for South Vietnamese pilots on covert bombing raids. The attack on the USS
Maddox, however, changed that when President Johnson and his advisers looked to the
Air Force to help strike back at North Vietnam. The Johnson administration’s strategy in
Vietnam in late 1964 revolved around utilizing America’s airpower in the hopes that no
ground troops would be needed. Couched in retaliatory rhetoric so as not to appear to be
appeasing the aggressors, the United States launched Operation Barrel Roll, a covert
operation, on December 14, 1964. Tasked with striking the enemy’s infiltration routes
from Laos, it marked the beginning of American escalation. Barrel Roll laid the
foundation for a similar retaliatory raid in February 1965 and for a three year bombing
campaign launched shortly thereafter.
Another facet of the air war that appeared in 1964 was the 1st Air Cavalry
Division, a unit that flew armed UH-1 Huey helicopters and was tasked with ferrying US
Airborne Rangers to and from battlefields. Colonel Jerry Childers had been with the 1st
Air Cav since its formation in Fort Benning, Georgia, where the unit had first tested the
concept of the air assault.209 After it had been proven to be a feasible concept, the unit
was deployed to Vietnam and arrived in Bien Hoa at the end of November 1964. By the
time their tour of duty had come to an end, on November 18, 1965, Childers’s “unit had
209 Jerry Childers, Without Parachutes: How I Survived 1,000 Attack Helicopter Combat Missions In
Vietnam (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2005), 19.
68
pioneered most of the armed helicopter tactics then in use in Vietnam.”210 Their successes
had laid the groundwork for a highly effective, versatile tool that could be utilized by
both the air and ground campaigns in the war against Communism in South Vietnam.
1965: From Advisors to Combatants
Six months after the Gulf of Tonkin incident solidified the LBJ administration’s
“tit-for-tat” approach to action, the North Vietnamese provided yet another justification
for the use of increased force. On February 7, 1965, Viet Cong guerrillas rained mortar
shells down on Camp Hollaway, the American air base at Pleiku. This incident destroyed
five UH-1B “Huey'' helicopters and damaged another nine, along with a reconnaissance
plane and fifty-two American billets, leaving eight Americans dead and over one hundred
wounded.211 Three days later, on February 10, a U.S. army billet at Quinhon was bombed
by the Viet Cong resulting in forty-four American casualties, including twenty-three dead
and twenty-one wounded. Within twelve hours, North Vietnamese military barracks and
storage facilities were under assault from American and South Vietnamese bombers.
Two Viet Cong attacks in three days, directed against Americans, led members of
the Johnson administration and its military advisers to push for a more substantial
increase in the graduated pressure strategy. President Johnson obliged them on February
13 with “a program of continuing air strikes against various targets in southern North
Vietnam.”212 Sustained bombing operations began on February 15, 1965, with Operation
Flaming Dart, “the name for the reprisal strikes against military barracks in the southern
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portion of North Vietnam.”213 These joint American-South Vietnamese air raids opened
with attacks on the North Vietnamese barracks at Chanh Hoa and Vu Con.214 Flaming
Dart represented the start of what would, a few weeks later, evolve into one of the
biggest, longest-lasting, most well-known, and most controversial operations of the war,
Operation Rolling Thunder.
As the US increased its sustained bombing campaign in an attempt to both hurt
North Vietnam and convince them to stop supporting war in the South, American leaders
needed to select targets they believed to be most important to the North. The selection
process for bombing missions ranked potential targets based on four criteria. The first of
the criteria was the military advantage of striking the target, second was the risks posed to
US aircraft, third was the danger associated with widening the war if the target is struck,
and fourth was the danger of inflicting heavy civilian casualties. The third item on the
list, the risk of widening the war, was the most important of the four criteria. One of the
most important documents regarding the United States’ bombing strategy, however, was
NSAM 328, which was published on April 6, 1965.215 In essence it said that the US
should continue to gradually increase Rolling Thunder operations at the pace it was
going. However, they should still be “prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate
of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off
sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.”216 Rolling
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Thunder missions would continue to be carried out for the next three years “and [would]
drop more bombs on Vietnam than had been dropped on all of Europe in World War
II.”217
Only two months into Operation Rolling Thunder, however, there arose plans to
use bombing pauses as “‘a path toward… peace or… increased military action,
depending upon the reaction of the Communists.’”218 In a memorandum to the president,
McGeorge Bundy explained that McNamara believed “that a pause now has a bare
chance of starting a chain reaction toward a settlement. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense believes that, even if a pause does not produce the full result this time, it would
contribute toward a settlement later.”219 Yet another interesting bombing-related
development occurred on November 15, 1965, when the US launched Operation Arc
Light. For the first time ever, B-52 strategic bombers, instead of the traditional
fighter/bomber attack aircraft, “were… employed in a tactical role in support of
American ground troops.”220 The significantly increased payload capacity of the B-52
was one of the biggest impacts such a move had on the battlefield since it meant that
American troops on the ground had access to a much larger amount of air support
ordnance, something that could prove lifesaving for American troops and prove costly for
the enemy’s.
Although the USAF had transitioned into a combat role and began significant
operations remarkably quickly, the US Navy (USN) still found itself engaged in its
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advisory role. However, even with advisors from the world’s most powerful navy,
Vietnam’s “Navy (VNN) failed to effectively stem the flow of supplies from North
Vietnam to South Vietnam,” which produced a feeling within the US Navy that they must
intervene directly in order to fix the infiltration problem.221 The USN’s main goal from
the war’s start had been to improve the VNN fighting force but, by 1965, “when it failed
to reach necessary operation benchmarks… the Navy began edging the VNN out of
certain operations.” This trend of progressively shutting the VNN out continued until a
1968 naval operation codenamed SEALORDS. Much like the course of the land war, “the
naval war in South Vietnam consisted of many small unit actions punctuated by only a
small number of larger operations.”222 As the Navy adapted to its new role, their
experiences contributed to several significant operational adaptations between 1965 and
1968. For example, the Navy’s interdiction campaign was expanded and two new
river-based forces were created, a patrol force and an amphibious assault force. All of
these developments were overseen by one man, Rear Admiral Norvell Gardiner.
Besides VNN’s failings, there was one other key influence spurring the naval
developments mentioned above: February 1965 saw the publication of the Buckalew
Report. The report proved significant because it was solely concerned with fighting the
naval campaign in Vietnam. Buckalew found that the communist supply system was
quite extensive, stretching into three countries, operating along major rivers, and utilizing
“a combination of man-carried and inland waterborne transfers.’” To combat the
infiltration, Buckalew offered the following three-part strategy, the first part which was
recognizing that “control of the rivers, especially the Mekong, Bassac, and related
222 Sherwood, War in the Shallows, 42, x.
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waterways, was essential to stemming the flow of enemy supplies.” Secondly, “a coastal
surveillance force was also necessary to prevent seaborne infiltration.” Finally, “to secure
the rivers, he advocated a system of fixed and mobile check points on bridges, major
canals, and waterway junctions manned by trained military or paramilitary personnel.”223
On February 16, 1965, the US Navy discovered a steel-hulled supply trawler from
North Vietnam at Vung Ro Bay in central Vietnam. The trawler, full of weapons,
ammunition, and other supplies, was proof of the occurrence of seaborne infiltration and
was a major motivation for the Navy’s renewed interest in coastal interdiction operations.
It also led to the creation of a “plan [that] called for a U.S. Navy sea and aircraft patrol
that would concentrate on locating oceangoing shipping like the steel-hulled trawler
discovered at Vung Ro.” These forces, divided up between the seventeenth parallel and
eight coastal patrol areas, were tasked with “track[ing] suspicious contacts and
vector[ing] VNN ships to board and search them.”224 This coastal interdiction campaign,
codenamed Operation Market Time, was the first significant naval operation toward
stopping the kinds of enemy infiltration outlined in the Buckalew Report. As the Navy’s
role in Vietnam increased, so too did the number of craft deployed to them for use in
coastal interdiction operations. Then, on July 31, 1965, the forces of Operation Market
Time were transferred to Task Force 115, under the chief of the Naval Advisory Group
[NAG], which “expanded the mission of the Naval Advisory Group from advising the
VNN to planning, executing, and leading combined combat operations.”225
Another interdiction operation, Game Warden, was, like Market Time, developed
due to the failures of the VNN. However, Game Warden differed from Market Time in
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that it focused on patrolling the rivers instead of the coast. On December 18, 1965, “the
U.S. Navy established Task Force 116 (River Patrol Force) to participate in Operation
Game Warden, a combined U.S. Navy-VNN operation to deny enemy movement and
resupply on the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and the RSSZ.”226 While not as
successful as Market Time in terms of interdiction, Game Warden did make important
contributions to the war effort in terms of pacification efforts, their combat capabilities,
and their influence in the creation of a third naval branch that played a major role in
pushing back the Tet Offensive in 1968.
While the US aerial and naval campaigns were conducting combat-related
missions by early 1965, President Johnson did not plan on sending American troops into
Vietnam. However, he had seemingly failed to consider the security resources required by
his increasing airstrike programs. A great majority of the US aircraft flying reprisal raids
or Rolling Thunder missions were based out of American airfields in South Vietnam.
These airfields had to have some sort of defense force to keep the facilities, personnel,
equipment, and weaponry a running safely and smoothly and, even if ARVN forces had
had a better reputation amongst American leadership, the US could not, for numerous
political and military reasons, allow South Vietnamese forces to provide sole security for
their bases. Thus, “because the start of the air war required ground troops to secure the air
bases, President Johnson, perhaps unwittingly, authorized the start of the ground war
simultaneously with Rolling Thunder.”227
Roughly 3,500 US Marines became the first US combat troops in Vietnam when
they landed near Da Nang, in South Vietnam, on March 8, 1965. However, they were
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restricted to the airfield, given orders to provide base security, and prohibited from any
offensive operations.228 Calls by military officials for a faster rate of increase in regards to
the graduated pressure against the North Vietnamese also increased the pressure on
Johnson to expand the ground war. On April 6, 1965, American ground forces were
officially enlarged and their mission was changed with NSAM 328. This National
Security Action Memorandum was the result of a number of strategic changes including
the approval of 18,000-20,000 additional ground troops, and the approval of “a change of
mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use
under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in
consultation with the Secretary of State.”229
Following the introduction of ground troops in Vietnam, American military
officials made slight but important changes to the US Army’s operational procedures.
The changes were meant to increase the chances of conducting a successful offensive
operation which had three requirements, the first of which being to find the enemy.
“Patrolling was essential to finding the enemy” and it was often undertaken by ground
operations utilizing large-unit sweeps.230 While these usually led to the discovery of
enemy supplies and the deaths of enemy troops, they hardly resulted in decisive battles.
New units began appearing around 1966 which, in an attempt to facilitate the uncovering
of enemy movements, combined “the combat power of U.S. soldiers with the invaluable
local knowledge of Vietnamese personnel.”231 The Combined Reconnaissance
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Intelligence Platoon, one of these new mixed formations, proved how useful such units
could be in finding the Communist’s secret infrastructure.
The second requirement for a successful offensive operation is, after finding the
enemy, fixing him in place. Encirclements had, in previous wars, proved effective in this
endeavor and were employed in Vietnam but, due to troop shortages and the tough
terrain, were somewhat porous. The helicopter proved not to be the cure-all that it was
hoped to be due to a number of factors. They were expensive to maintain and operate and
were initially in short supply. Although you could move much quicker by flying over the
rough terrain, its noise often tipped off the enemy and allowed him to escape. Finally,
their vulnerability to ground fire not only produced difficulties when trying to insert
troops into an enemy-infested area, it also meant that it was extremely difficult to
redeploy troops once inserted, meaning airmobile troops lost their mobility advantage
over the enemy. Still, some type of encirclement, either on the ground or by helicopter,
“remained the single best method available to the Army to compel a reluctant enemy to
accept battle.”232
After achieving the first two requirements, the operation had to end in the
destruction of the enemy. However, the Communist forces were formidable foes and,
while the US held obvious advantages in regards to ammunition supply, artillery, and air
power, the firepower of the Communist’s typical main force infantry battalion and that of
the US’s infantry battalion were about the same. Another problem was the ability of NVA
and Viet Cong forces to remain so well concealed “that most contacts occurred at less
than forty-six meters,” which significantly impeded both the US soldiers’ ability to
successfully maneuver and their ability to call in artillery or air support without being hit
232 Birtle, COIN, 378.
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themselves. The Army’s experiences soon led to modifications to combat tactics such as
infantry assaults, while still integral, beginning to be overtaken in importance by the
application of artillery and bombardment. This shift, occurring in late 1965 and early
1966, “became the basis for U.S. tactics for the rest of the war.” Known as “pile on”
tactics, infantry forces now utilized small patrols to find the enemy, called in airmobile
reinforcements to encircle him, “then bury him under an avalanche of air- and
artillery-delivered ordnance.” Although there were many US advisers and military
officials who saw the increasing reliance on firepower as having a deteriorating effect on
the combat ability of the infantry, without “U.S. fire support, many a battle large and
small would have been lost.”233
As the US continued increasing its troop levels in Vietnam and sought to take the
fight to the enemy, they were finally given their wish in mid-November 1965. The
significance that would be placed on the first few days of a twelve-day campaign were
the result of the fact that it was the first time that the US was engaged in a conventional
contest with North Vietnamese regular forces. The American forces sent into the Ia Drang
Valley on November 14, 1965 were those of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry
Airmobile Division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore. 234 The ways in which
Moore and his troopers utilized airmobile search-and-destroy warfare led Westmoreland
to point to this battle to demonstrate two key components of his strategy.  First, he
emphasized that the body count would be used to keep track of progress in a war
unconcerned with establishing, holding, and expanding a true front line and second “what
fire and air power could achieve in support of ‘search-and-destroy.’”235
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The Battle of Ia Drang, which began on the morning of November 14, 1965, was
the first Airmobile troopers arrived at Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray, whereupon the
helicopters returned to the American base and brought in the next wave until all were in
the valley. Lieutenant Moore recalled, “our intention with this bold helicopter assault into
the clearing at the base of the Chu Pong massif had been to find the enemy, and we had
obviously succeeded beyond our wildest expectations.” Finding themselves vastly
outnumbered, Moore and the 1st Cavalry faced such intense resistance that, in just two
hours of fighting on November 15, Charlie Company alone had lost sixty-two men,
forty-two of them dead and twenty wounded. The 1st Cavalry was relieved by
reinforcements on November 16 and, by that time, they had sustained 79 fatalities and
121 men wounded.236 The enemy, on the other hand, suffered 834 confirmed dead and six
soldiers taken prisoner, but it was estimated that American air support killed another
1,215 NVA troops.237 Although the engagement seemed to have come to a successful
conclusion, fighting in the area would continue.
What made November 14-16, 1965 so important to Westmoreland? To begin with,
Lieutenant Moore pointed out, Westmoreland “thought he had found the answer to the
question of how to win this war: He would trade one American life for ten or eleven or
twelve North Vietnamese lives, day after day, until Ho Chi Minh cried uncle.” Just as
important, however, was how the battle had “validated both the principle and the practice
of airmobile warfare.”238 It is important to remember that one of the Huey pilots, Jerry
Childers, whose tour ended just four days after the Battle of Ia Drang, had been with the
unit in Fort Benning, Georgia, just one year before the battle as they finished testing out
238 Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, 374.
237 Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, 215-216.
236 Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, 100, 178-179, 216.
78
this brand-new concept in warfare. Only one year after developing an ultramodern attack
style, sixteen helicopters, carrying a total of about eighty soldiers into the valley every
thirty minutes, had flown an entire battalion of approximately 450 men into enemy-held
territory on a search-and-destroy mission.
From 10:48 in the morning, when the first wave of troopers landed until 3:20 that
afternoon, when the last wave arrived, the whole operation had been carried out in
approximately four and one-half hours. The Airmobile pilots continued flying missions
for another ten hours, despite taking enemy fire most of the day, and brought
much-needed supplies and ammunition to keep Moore and his men in the fight then
evacuating wounded and dead Americans back to their base. Along with the battalions
near-seamless use of artillery and air support, nearly 450 Americans had defeated a force
of approximately 1,600 North Vietnamese and inflicted at least four times as many
casualties. A tactical demonstration such as the one put on by Moore’s men in the Ia
Drang Valley was a huge boost to the doctrines of both airmobile warfare and
search-and-destroy tactics, albeit a “restricted” version, and they were often made prime
examples of the strategy’s success by their advocates, such as Westmoreland. It also
demonstrated high levels of US military ingenuity and ability in regards to weaponry
development and its tactical utilization. Although airmobile warfare would continue to
prove beneficial to ground operations, no future search-and-destroy operation would
achieve the success of Ia Drang.
1966: Going on the Offensive
The air campaign of 1966 looked very similar to its 1965 appearances. The
progression of the new year’s air missions can be seen through the accounts of those who
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strapped themselves into a jet aircraft and rained down death and destruction on the
enemy. One such man was Brigadier General Jerry Cook, a fighter pilot in the United
States Air Force (USAF) whose first tour of duty lasted for much of 1966. Like many
other fighter pilots, Cook was tasked with carrying out a variety of different types of
missions. On some missions, Cook and his flight were tasked with anti-personnel strikes
during which they would drop napalm on enemy forces in the target area.239 Other
missions required Cook and his wingman to fly into the Laotian Mountains in order to
track down and destroy enemy cargo trucks that were attempting to resupply Communist
forces in South Vietnam.240 Pilots like Cook were also sometimes called upon to destroy
enemy heavy weapons that had pinned down American forces in their camp or while out
on patrol. Another important task conducted by fighter pilots was providing protection
for the US’s electronic-countermeasure aircraft and their fighter bombers on missions
into North Vietnam. On these types of missions, US fighters hunted for and engaged
enemy MiGs in air-to-air combat, a high-risk action that resulted in one American fighter
jet lost for every two MiGs downed.241
The US Navy was also an important contributor to the air campaign with their
carrier-based aircraft. Naval fighter pilots like Lieutenant Elkins faced the same amount
of variability in their missions as their USAF counterparts. For the first week or so of
their deployment, USN pilots conducted close air support missions as a way to help them
transition into their new role and environment. There were also missions with the sole
objective of setting Viet Cong rice fields on fire in order to deny them access to food.
Elkins also took part in a two-flight day, the first of which focused on destroying a Viet
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Cong headquarters and the second focused on destroying the enemy’s billeting areas. He
also flew missions in support of strategic bombing runs, during which he was tasked with
suppressing enemy anti-aircraft weaponry, such as flak guns or Surface to Air Missiles
(SAMs). Unfortunately, however, Lieutenant Elkins was shot down and killed on October
13, 1966, just five months into his tour, a tragic reminder of the extreme dangers that
were faced, even above the battlefield.242
In 1966, American naval forces began to make significant impacts on strategic
and operational aspects of the war. Two Market Time actions in the early months of 1966
proved to be significant to the overall campaign by revealing important limitations
presented by the Swift boats used by forces in Task Force 115. The first of these occurred
on Valentine’s Day, 1966, when a mine was detonated underneath PCF-4, destroying the
craft and killing four of its six crew.243 The loss of PCF-4, along with the loss of a second
PCF in March, demonstrated how vulnerable these unarmored patrol boats were to
explosive weaponry. It would have been close to suicide for one of these vessels to
attempt a trip up a river, where they could be ambushed at anytime by communists who
mined the river or used RPGs. By the end of the year, PCFs were not allowed to cross
into rivers unless they had special consent or were in pursuit of a vessel.
Despite these issues, Market Time proved to be effective against infiltration
efforts by large, steel-hulled trawlers.244 According to historian Mark Moyar, “Market
Time swiftly brought Hanoi’s maritime infiltration operations to ruin,” but it “was much
less successful in stemming the flow of supplies coming into the country [by river] on
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smaller wooden-hulled junks.”245 However, this realization actually served to strengthen
naval efforts because it was perfectly handled by USN leaders. TF 115’s strengths and
weaknesses were considered and the force was tasked with operating solely along the
Vietnamese coast, in waters that their craft were best-suited for, and opposing the enemy
“forces” it was most effective against, in this case the steel-hulled trawlers. The proper
utilization of TF 115 as a coastline interdiction force was so successful that the North
Vietnamese all but gave up on coastal infiltration efforts.
Instead of forcing the TF 115’s inadequate craft into environments of near-certain
failure, the US Navy simply developed a new force geared towards  riverine warfare.
Task Force 116, also known as the River Patrol Force, was to carry out Operation Game
Warden, the US Navy’s river interdiction campaign. Game Warden’s original mission,
stated in its operation order of February 1966, “was to prevent Communist exploitation of
the waterways by patrolling the major inland rivers.” The other three components of the
plan were “searching suspicious craft, enforcing curfews, [and] keeping the main
shipping channel into Saigon open by patrolling and minesweeping in the Long Tau
River.”246 Thus, TF 116 started out as a police force focused on “searching water traffic
for contraband and checking papers of civilians traveling on the rivers but quickly
evolved into a mobile strike force intent upon attacking Viet Cong (VC) positions and
disrupting river crossings.”247 Their success in the latter types of operations helped spark
interest in creating a naval group dedicated solely to searching for, responding quickly to,
and raining destruction on the enemy. It would prove crucial in repulsing Tet Offensive
attacks in their area of operation.
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TF 116’s most significant engagement of 1966 came as a result of a February 26
Viet Cong ambush of the Panamanian coastal freighter SS Lorinda in the Long Tau
channel of the Run Sat swamp. Following the ambush, MACV called for a large-scale
amphibious raid to ease and/or eliminate enemy pressure on the shipping channel. In the
two-phased plan, codenamed Operation Jackstay, the first phase would be an
amphibious-launched assault on the Long Thanh Peninsula by marines who were to
secure it and cut off potential village support to the Viet Cong. Following that, Phase 2
would begin and focus on suspected VC base areas deep in the Rung Sat. Jackstay was
launched on March 26 and Phase 2 of the operation began two days later. By the end of
the operation, April 6, 1966, the enemy suffered 63 deaths while TF 116 suffered five
dead and thirty-one wounded.
Operation Jackstay proved significant for several reasons, one of which being that
it was the war’s “first full-scale U.S. amphibious operation… carried out in a river
delta.”248 It also garnered significance because it proved successful by starting a period of
declining enemy activity and was furthered by Game Warden patrols launched on April
10. Furthermore, Jackstay “tested many concepts that would become standard for U.S.
forces as the war progressed - namely river assaults, river patrol, and the integration of
airpower, ground power, and naval power in a riverine environment.”249 Finally,
Operation Jackstay demonstrated the Navy could challenge communist control of the
rivers with technology and firepower. Such a result quickly made it clear that the US
Navy could, and already was, achieving significant success in the war.
249 Sherwood, War in the Shallows, 103.
248 Sherwood, War in the Shallows, 102.
83
1966 also saw the formation of the third arm of America’s naval campaign in
Vietnam, the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). The MRF was formed to search out and
destroy the enemy in the Mekong Delta in support of General Westmoreland’s strategy of
searching out and destroying enemy formations and base areas throughout the country.
The MRF’s Navy component, also known as the River Assault Force, or Task Force 117,
would work with the Army to conduct river assault missions. More specifically, TF 117
was “responsible for transporting elements of the U.S. Army’s 9th Infantry Division to
and from assault zones in the Mekong Delta and providing fire support for the troops
while they operated in the rice paddies and jungles.”250 The creation of TF 117 was yet
another stroke of genius by the US Navy. Instead of saddling Task Force 116 with every
riverine mission that arose, whether it was designed for such an action or not, naval
leadership saw TF 116’s success in searching for enemy forces down but again refused to
force a unit into missions they were not adequately prepared for. Instead, TF 116 would
continue with its original mission while a new riverine hunter-killer unit could be
developed specifically for the task. Had the other branches of the US military adopted
approaches to their war campaigns like that of the Navy, the Vietnam War would almost
certainly have been an overwhelming American victory.
Ground operations during 1966 continued to achieve their missions and defeat
enemy forces, even as new issues began to be encountered. One such impediment was the
one-year tour of duty decision discussed in the previous chapter, which resulted in having
to replace a soldier  around the time he became adequately experienced in combat with a
new recruit that was fresh out of basic training. The experiences of David Adams, a
Lance Corporal in the United States Marine Corps (USMC), provide a valuable insight
250 Sherwood, War in the Shallows, 165.
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into how the ground war was progressing. A squad leader in the 1st Platoon’s Alpha
Company of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, Adams arrived in-country at the start of
1966 and was stationed on Hill 55. The hill was an important part of the US’s defensive
line protecting the crucial airbase in Da Nang and thus drew a significant amount of
enemy attention. Adams described how his unit was involved in contact with enemy
forces almost daily and the increasing number of casualties on both sides. In his eyes,
there appeared to be no end to the insanity that he was faced with on a daily basis. The
main role of the 1st Battalion was “to keep the VC off balance and guard against a major
attack on the vital air base at Da Nang.” They ran daily squad- and platoon-sized patrols
from their battalion headquarters on Hill 55, which proved increasingly difficult due to
the “constant incoming small arms fire, the ever present booby traps and trip-wires with
the occasional land mines.” However, after only a couple of months in South Vietnam,
Adams’s tour came to an early end when he was wounded on patrol, a fate that befell
countless other American soldiers.251
Soldiers from other units faced experiences similar to David Adams’s. In 1966
Jerome Doherty, a 2nd Lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion, Fifth Marines, was commanding
his own rifle platoon in H Company. They were positioned on Hill 76, from which they
conducted daily patrols like numerous other units stationed throughout the country but
Doherty’s unit differed from many others in the areas it found itself patrolling. Hill 76
was located near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), meaning that Doherty’s unit was tasked
with patrolling areas that were largely deemed to have been enemy sanctuaries. For
instance, on one mission, H Company was ordered to patrol the Ben Hai River, located in
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the DMZ, and capture a prisoner.252 Although they successfully captured an enemy, he
died before they could return to base, succumbing to wounds suffered in the firefight
prior to his capture. Doherty also experienced the increasing size and scope of the orders
handed down by command. This was exemplified by Operation Tuscaloosa, a three-day
patrol near the Thu Bon River, a well-known trouble area. American commanders tasked
two companies with tracking down and destroying a North Vietnamese division that was
believed to be in the area. H Company ran into the enemy head on and found itself
outmanned but managed to break through the enemy’s positions, sending them running in
all directions. Despite their successes, the number of casualties in Doherty’s company
were a grim reminder of the realities of war, as they suffered “over two hundred killed
and wounded in less than a year of combat.”253
1967:  American Military Might and Pacification
The importance of naval operations in Vietnam kept evolving in 1967 with
significant duties being added to the primary missions of TF 115 and TF 116. One of
their new responsibilities was conducting naval gunfire support (NGFS) missions. Such
operations supplemented American airpower and artillery by providing yet another
source of superior American firepower to help embattled American ground forces.
Furthermore, according to naval scholar John Darrell Sherwood, by the summer of 1967,
“psychological warfare had emerged as one of the most important secondary missions for
Market Time forces.”254 The growth of naval operations continued with the arrival of TF
117.
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Task Force 117 immediately set to work on their mission to take the fight to the
enemy. Within a month of their arrival, the MRF launched River Raider [phase] I, “a
series of company- and platoon-size search and destroy operations in areas along the
upper Long Tau River” that lasted from February 16 to March 4, 1967. The second phase
of River Raider took place from March 5 to March 19 and “included multi-company
attacks against VC logistics facilities in the southwestern portion of the RSSZ.” By the
end of the operation, twenty-two enemy fighters had been killed compared to eight
wounded US Army soldiers. Task Force 117 followed up River Raider with a similar
operation in the RSSZ [Rung Sat Special Zone], codenamed Spearhead I, during which
thirteen Viet Cong were killed. Next was Operation Coronado I, which lasted from June
1, 1967 to July 26, 1967, an operation that proved significant for being the first one
which involved heavy contact with enemy forces. On June 19, Company A, 4th Battalion,
47th Infantry was ambushed by Viet Cong forces, resulting in the death or wounding of
nearly every American in the company. By the end of the engagement, the US Army had
suffered 200 casualties, fifty of which were killed and the remaining 150 having been
wounded, while the Navy suffered fifteen wounded. It was reported that the Viet Cong
suffered 170 killed in action. “Coronado I, in many respects, set the pattern for future
MRF operations” by demonstrating “that the Viet Cong only intended to engage the MRF
with large units at times and places of its choosing - usually in well-placed ambushes
designed to inflict maximum casualties on the American side.”255 TF 117 launched
several more of these types of operations in 1967, all of which had similar results. These
operations demonstrated the strength and effectiveness of the US Navy and provided an
example of what could happen when the US’s military might was correctly utilized.
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Ground efforts of 1967 saw an increased emphasis on pacification efforts, which
led to the creation of small outposts called Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG)
camps. These camps were manned by local South Vietnamese troops who were advised
by members of the United States’ Special Forces. One such camp was located in the
district of Dak To and the fighting that took place on its western outskirts proved to be
one of the significant land engagements of 1967. On November 7, Lieutenant Colonel
James Johnson, the 4th Battalion’s commander, was ordered to take two battalions west
of Dak To to confront North Vietnamese forces in the area. Skirmishes between elements
on either side had occurred on November 3 and November 4, both of which were won by
the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies thanks in large part to the supporting
fire from US artillery and airstrikes. However, just three days later, as the companies of
Colonel Johnson’s 4th Battalion took up positions they were quickly confronted by
enemy troops. As American troops continued to be heavily pressured by enemy forces,
American airstrikes were, according to Captain Thomas H. Baird, “instrumental - perhaps
decisive - in preventing a penetration of the perimeter.” Despite being an opening round
in a battle that would last two and a half weeks, the November 7 battle “had driven at
least a portion of the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment back toward the Cambodian
border and materially lessened the threat to Dak To.”256 This represented a significant
American victory due to the fact that they had successfully attacked, overtaken, and held
on to territory previously held by the enemy. Although fifteen Americans had been killed
and another forty-eight had been wounded, 117 enemy troops had been killed, making the
battle of Dak To a massive success in terms of body count. This alternative to the
haphazard and wasteful search-and-destroy missions usually employed to find enemy
256 Albright, Cash, and Sanstrum, Seven Firefights in Vietnam, 97, 108.
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forces proved that there were better ways in which American ground troops could be
utilized to achieve success. These operations proved, when conducted correctly, the war
was winnable.
1968: The Tet Offensive
After spending the last months of 1967 engaged in a heavy bombing campaign in
the northern border regions of South Vietnam, aerial units in the area were called on in
January 1968 to conduct a similar mission, but this time in a much more concentrated
spot: the besieged base of Khe Sanh. Westmoreland “understood that the key to
successfully holding off enemy forces at Khe Sanh was allied air power” and “instructed
General William Momyer, his Air Force deputy, to plan such defenses.” The operation
was code named Niagara “‘to invoke an image of cascading shells and bombs.’” It was an
apt codename, exemplified by “by one account [which stated that] over 24,000
fighter-bomber sorties and 2,700 [sorties] by B-52s [dropped] a total of 110,000 tons of
bombs during the enemy’s seventy-seven-day siege.”257 The aerial campaigns after the
Tet Offensive were, more often than not, bombing missions in support of American
forces bogged down as they tried to clean up the remnants of the Tet Offensive.
When thinking about the Tet Offensive, the surprise attack launched by the
Communists in January 1968, most think of the images of urban battles raging in streets
between ground forces that were released on the nightly news or by journalists and
photographers. However, there was another branch that, although largely ignored in
discussions regarding the Tet Offensive, performed just as impressive as, if not more
than, those ground troops. Naval actions, especially those of the Mobile Reaction Force,
257 Lewis Sorley, Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,
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proved instrumental in repulsing the Tet Offensive in the Mekong Delta, the defense of
the major cities and towns in the area, and the prevention of a possible flanking maneuver
against the American forces, occupied in northern locations, by the communists from the
delta. The MRF helped “transform a potential defeat into a devastating blow for the Viet
Cong.” The ability of the Naval, the South Vietnamese, and the Army personnel making
up the MRF to defend the major cities and towns in the delta whilst dealing with the
simultaneous attacks of seven Viet Vong battalions, along with the countless local
communist fighters, “remains one of the greatest triumphs of the war.”258 The significance
of their actions can be seen by the way they turned the tide of battle, and how quickly
they did it, in numerous cities and towns.
Within hours of the MRF’s assault on My Tho, the Viet Cong were fleeing the
positions they had fought so hard for. By the assault’s end, the VC suffered as many as
400 casualties. Meanwhile, ARVN forces lost twenty-five killed and an undetermined
number of wounded and the US suffered three killed and fifty-seven wounded. After
arriving at Vinh Long on February 4, the MRF wasted little time fighting off the
communists and were able to end their counterinsurgency efforts just eight days later.
During that span, the MRF killed 269 VC while suffering only twelve deaths themselves.
Operations at Can Tho, one of the biggest post-Tet mop-up operations, lasted from
February 14 to February 28. Two American battalions landed on February 14 and quickly
forced the enemy to withdraw. Then, on February 22, MRF and South Vietnamese troops
conducted an operation near Can Tho to find the Viet Cong’s Military Region III
headquarters and destroy it. Sixty VC were quickly killed in a short engagement upon the
Allies’ arrival. The MRF and ARVN forces then established a perimeter and killed
258 Sherwood, War in the Shallows, 276.
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another 68 VC troops, for a total of 129 enemies killed in action during the operation.
The US also suffered 128 casualties but only 19 of them were dead, the rest merely
wounded. The allied force’s victory at Can Tho was most significant, however, because it
“was the last major delta city to face a significant Viet Cong threat during the Tet
Offensive.”259
In late January 1968, the Marines stationed at their base in Khe Sanh were
attacked by two NVA divisions who then began a prolonged offensive against the base.
Westmoreland believed that Khe Sanh must be held because this battle would mark the
turning point of the war in Vietnam by allowing the US to finally reach the
long-sought-after crossover point and forcing the North to surrender. Holding the base
was also of critical importance to Westmoreland because it provided a line of defense
against an offensive Westmoreland believed the Communists were preparing to launch in
the Quang Tri Province. The importance of holding the base was echoed by other military
leaders, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, who
considered Khe Sanh tactically important for both offensive possibilities, like launching
covert operations teams and for defensive reasons regarding flank security. Furthermore,
Wheeler pointed out that giving up or losing the base would be a devastating blow for
American public opinion and morale. Despite fighting for their lives and undergoing a
siege of almost seven months, Khe Sanh turned out not to be the turning point after all,
ending instead in the withdrawal of American troops from the base. More importantly,
Khe Sanh became a distraction for the US military leadership, causing them to overlook
intelligence that suggested a potential Communist offensive might extend beyond the
Quang Tri Province in which Khe Sanh was located. With the US abandoning the base, it
259 Sherwood, War in the Shallows, 310.
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appeared as though the Communists had achieved a significant victory in an offensive
against a limited area.
The real blow was the Tet Offensive, which “marked a major turning point in the
Vietnam War.”260 On January 31, 1968, during the agreed-upon Tet holiday ceasefire,
sixty-seven thousand communist fighters launched attacks on thirty-six of the forty-four
provincial capitals in South Vietnam, sixty-four of the country’s 245 district capitals, and
continued the so-called wilderness battles against bases like the one in Khe Sanh. The
Americans and their South Vietnamese allies were caught off guard and the sizable
communist forces initially made significant gains, even managing to breach the walls of
the US Embassy in Saigon. However, the American forces and their allies were able to
recover rather quickly and drive out the communists from most of the cities, towns, and
villages, overtaken within an hour or two of the counterassault being launched. Part of the
reason they were able to mount such a quick and successful recovery was the previously
mentioned naval operations in the Mekong Delta.
Thanks to the impressive, MRF-powered response by the Navy’s riverine forces,
there was less of a need to deploy American ground forces to the region in an effort to
counterassault and/or defend against any flanking maneuvers. Instead, more troops from
the Army and USMC could be deployed to areas in the northern part of the country,
creating an overpowering counterassault movement. The only major exception to this had
been in the city of Hue, where brutal fighting took place for about a month after Tet. Not
only did the Allied forces retake nearly all of the areas they had lost, they also inflicted a
significant amount of casualties on the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. In fact,
“the Vietcong was essentially wiped out during the battle[s],” and “from then on, the bulk
260 “The Tet Offensive and the End of Escalation,“ in Herring, ed., The Pentagon Papers, 208.
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of the enemy consisted of North Vietnamese Regulars.”261 When viewed in terms of its
tactical outcome, the Tet Offensive was unquestionably a landslide victory for the US and
South Vietnamese. However, Americans back in the United States, stunned by the size of
the enemy’s attack after years of hearing about the progress being made in the war,
struggled to view it in a tactical sense. Instead they were astonished by the
unpreparedness of South Vietnam’s defenders and transfixed by the news footage
broadcast from South Vietnam of the vicious, bloody, close-quarter combat that engulfed
the country. As a result, Tet made many Americans realize for the first time that they
might not win in Vietnam. The near-total loss of support for the war at home essentially
ensured that any aggressive push for victory would be a nonstarter and would most likely
fail. Despite all of the military advantages possessed by the US in Vietnam, advantages
that almost certainly would have led to victory if properly utilized, America’s leaders had
wasted nearly four years of opportunities and, beginning with the Tet Offensive, 1968
saw the deterioration of any real hope for an outright victory in Vietnam.
The best course of action in Vietnam would have been to emphasize controlling
the area. Instead, Westmoreland focused on winning a war of attrition by tracking down
and forcing the enemy into large engagements in which the US could destroy them. The
problem was it required an immense amount of movement just to conduct the numerous
search-and-destroy patrols that such a strategy required. Although the attrition strategy
was designed to wear down the Communist forces, it proved equally wearisome on US
forces.262 Rather than focusing on controlling specific areas, Westmoreland’s
determination to defend all of South Vietnam also frustrated his troops.263
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A series of Department of Defense studies in 1967 revealed that enemy forces had
some ability to control the amount of losses they suffered by controlling the pace of
action.264 This was partly a result of America’s attrition strategy and its related tactics.
Search-and-destroy operations not only wore out American troops, it also stretched them
out over large areas, meaning there were gaps and pockets in American lines that the
enemy could move through. The cross-border restrictions on US operations also provided
the enemy with areas for them to escape to that they knew would be safe. In reality,
“General Westmoreland’s ‘strategy’ of attrition in South Vietnam was… the absence of a
strategy.” The military activities that resulted lacked a clearly defined objective to aim
for.265
Lieutenant Colonel Moore, the leader of the 1st Air Cavalry unit made famous by
the Battle of Ia Drang, viewed his 1966 campaign in Bong Son as an example of the
incorrect approach to pursuing the Vietnam War on the ground. Moore was tasked with
leading his men into the Bong Son plain to clear the enemy from the area, then turn it
over to the South Vietnamese military to secure and allow their civil officials to
administer to. There was vicious fighting “and, by the time the enemy had been routed,
82 of my men were dead and another 318 wounded.” It had been a high price to pay but
the region had been liberated, or so it seemed. Within a week of the US force’s
withdrawal, Communist forces had returned to Bong son. Moore’s brigade would be sent
back to the village twice more in 1966 and suffered many more killed and wounded.266 It
represented the folly and wastefulness of chasing around the enemy instead of ensuring
firm control over important areas. Had the US kept control of the area, they could have
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avoided losing more troops to additional assaults and could have denied the enemy an
important operational area.
The US placed a significant emphasis on the use of air power from the start,
exemplified by Rolling Thunder, the strategic bombing program against North Vietnam.
However, as with the land campaign, restrictions were implemented in regards to where
missions could be flown and what targets could be struck. These had severely adverse
effects on a crucial part of American military muscle. For example, the first target that
John McCain had been given upon his arrival on the USS Forrestal in 1967 was a
military barracks, but one that “had been bombed twenty-seven times before; it was just a
pile of rubble.”267 These kinds of missions not only represented wasted resources and
needless danger, they also represented wasted opportunities to inflict real damage on the
enemy. In an October 1966 telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Admiral Sharp,
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), argued that “self-imposed controls
on the use of air power against NVN [North Vietnam] have had an adverse impact upon
the effectiveness of air power in reducing the capability of NVN to direct and support the
insurgency in SVN [South Vietnam].”268 Even decades after the war, many in the military,
especially those in the Air Force, “blame the failure of air power to deliver the expected
results on the decision to mount a campaign of graduated pressures instead of applying
maximum available force from the start.”269
The naval component of the Vietnam War was arguably the most consistent and
most effective of America’s three combat arms. The conflict “revealed that the U.S.
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Navy, when pressed, can adapt rapidly to a shallow water environment and prevail.” The
coastline interdiction campaign known as Operation Market Time, conducted by Task
Force 115, rapidly affected the Communist’s resupply efforts and it represented the
Navy’s most successful interdiction program. Meanwhile, Task Force 116’s riverine
operations, known as Game Warden, was not as successful at interdiction but, as a direct
action force, it proved very successful in disrupting Viet Cong operations and helping the
US secure the delta’s major rivers. Their “biggest successes involved attacks against VC
troops crossing the large rivers and other types of attacks against VC combat troops, so
much so that direct action emerged as a significant Game Warden mission by the end of
1968.” Their abilities and effectiveness were made perfectly clear during the Tet
Offensive, during which Game Warden forces proved to be a critical factor in the defense
of many of the villages in the Mekong Delta. Finally, the Mobile Riverine Force, a
heavily-armed reactionary unit codenamed Task Force 117, was able to operate in an
environment inaccessible to all other means of transportation except helicopters. Their
ability to transport reinforcements, assault teams, materials, and weaponry almost
anywhere in the delta proved to be of significant benefit. Although heavier casualty
numbers seemed to fall on this naval unit in particular, “the MRF as a whole killed more
enemy soldiers than any other brown water unit deployed by the U.S. Navy in the
Vietnam War, but it also took some of the heaviest losses.”270 Had the successes of the
US’s naval efforts been combined with the proper utilization of their ground and air
power, America could have been victorious in Vietnam by the end of President Johnson’s
time in office.




The South Vietnamese government (GVN) needed to regain the trust and support
of the rural peasantry, whom they had virtually ignored for years, while also preventing
the Communists from entering rural areas and fomenting anymore issues. However, an
over-militarized push would alienate those peasants they needed support from, while the
lack of a military component would allow the enemy to disrupt the program and harm
those involved. Thus, like with so many other aspects of the war, being victorious would
find the correct balance of armed security operations and civic programs. The enemy
needed to be driven out of the villages designated for civic action and kept out of the area
to prevent any interference. The strategy of Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) designed
by the US Marine Corps (USMC) proved it could be successful even with minimal
manpower, and after a few slight changes it could have been expanded across Vietnam
and proven very successful.
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In South Vietnam, the government had been much more connected to and visible
in urban areas, which meant that it was in these areas that anti-communist attitudes were
strongest amongst the public. The South Vietnamese countryside, however, had been, for
all intents and purposes, forgotten about by the country’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, and
his administration. Therefore, the GVN scrambled to make its presence felt in its
countryside and make up for the years of neglect by “improving” the lives of rural
Vietnamese with revolutionary development programs. Thus, officials in Saigon hoped
they could garner the rural population’s support for the Diem’s government, which those
in the countryside viewed in a largely negative light. Meanwhile, Communist forces were
focused on using the countryside to acquire the resources that would prove critical to
their warmaking efforts. These resources came in two forms, manpower for
reinforcements and food supplies to keep their forces fed.271
The Americans and the GVN were aware of the importance of the rural area to the
Communists and the two nations worked together to create a “national strategy of
‘Pacification and Development’ [that] was designed to separate the Communists from
it.”272 This was an important objective because the countryside was vital to both types of
Communist forces in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong not only lived and worked in their
villages, but also used them as Communist recruitment areas and even hiding places for
fellow Communists, if necessary. Meanwhile, the countryside was critical to the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) units operating in the South because they depended on it for
food and for its well-developed Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI), which could provide
various forms of help during their missions. Thus, the US-GVN joined together in
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conducting pacification efforts. The US government recognized that the government of
Saigon needed to make its own efforts to apologize to and regain the trust of the South
Vietnamese countryside. The Strategic Hamlet program made it quickly and painfully
apparent that letting the GSV take the public lead in this was a highly problematic
decision.
The “Allied Pacification and Development” Program and Early Approaches
South Vietnamese General Tran Dinh Tho defined pacification as “the military,
political, economic, and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government
responsive to and involving the participation of the people.”273 This included programs
that stimulated economic growth, land reform, and greater political participation, as well
as increased security through anti-insurgent operations by police and paramilitary
forces.274 The Allied Pacification and Development program, which began in 1961, had
three national goals, the first of which being ending “the war, which implied eliminating
Viet Cong infrastructure, defeating invasion forces and maintaining security.”275 The
second pacification goal was “to develop democracy, which implied the establishment of
elective government and democratic institutions and enlisting the participation of the
people in national life,” and the third was “to reform society by eliminating injustice and
social vices, and providing every citizen equal opportunities for advancement and equal
protection under the law.”276
276 Tho, Pacification, 8.
275 Tho, Pacification, 8.
274 Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle For Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995), 3.
273 Tho, Pacification, v.
99
1962-1963: The Strategic Hamlet Program
The goals of the Pacification and Development campaign sparked a South
Vietnamese initiative known as the Strategic Hamlet program. While the South
Vietnamese were the ones in the forefront, travelling the countryside to implement its
plan, Strategic Hamlets represented a joint effort, as American aid and funding made it
possible. The program called for the development of a system of village defense that
contributed to the nation’s overall security.277 There were five criteria that had to be met
before a village could be declared a “Strategic Hamlet.” These included a neutralized
enemy infrastructure, a population that “had been organized for hamlet defense,” the
establishment of a defense system, the construction of “secret underground shelters for
weapons and personnel… for the hamlet defense force,” and the election of a functioning
council and administrative body for the hamlet.278
Beginning in early 1962, the goal was to create a population that “would become
the primary force in the fight against enemy guerrillas.”279 The government of South
Vietnam constructed fortified settlements designed to allow local authorities to increase
their control over the political activities of the peasantry and to resist communist attacks
more effectively. By the end of 1962, over six hundred of these hamlets, ringed by moats
and bamboo spikes, were complete, with hundreds more under construction.280 However,
the Strategic Hamlet program served to further alienate much of the peasantry from
Diem’s government because, to achieve program success, the peasants had to be uprooted
from their ancestral homelands and failed to provide the material benefits that had been
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promised.281 To make matters worse, upon arriving at the location of their new strategic
hamlet, the peasants were forced to construct the defences themselves, all to protect
themselves from the Viet Cong, who in reality threatened the government officials more
than the peasantry.282 This all but ensured the government’s loss of countryside support,
instead inspiring deep anger towards Saigon in the peasantry.
One of the most unbelievable aspects of this program, however, was that
“frequently, strategic hamlets were thrown together in such slapdash fashion that
Vietcong agents remained inside, acting as informants for their comrades.”283 It seems
unfathomable that such a crucial mistake could be made in a campaign that was designed
to prevent the enemy from having access to the South Vietnamese peasants, much less be
made more than once, because it defeated the program’s purpose in the first place. Diem
and his government were clearly more interested in how other countries, namely the US,
viewed viewed their anti-Communist efforts than how their own citizens viewed their
country. This is a perfect example of local grievances that Communists exploited to win
support in South Vietnam.284 While attempting to win support for their own country, the
South Vietnamese government had instead created Viet Cong sympathizers.285 When
President Diem had been overthrown in November 1963, the Strategic Hamlet program
came to a halt and, in early 1964, was officially abandoned.
1964: The Oil Spot and Hop Tac
The new South Vietnamese government was forced to find a new way to achieve
US-GVN pacification goals, and the US showed a greater interest in the planning of these
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new operations. In February 1964, General Nguyen Khanh published a new pacification
plan that he had formulated with the aid of the American Embassy and MACV. Known as
Chien Thang, or “Will to Victory,” it introduced a significant new strategy towards
achieving pacification by envisioning “the steady expansion of the government’s
presence like an oil spot spreading from secure to contested and insecure areas.”286 The
idea of the oil spot would become a rather important component of future pacification
efforts. Chien Thang also attempted “to avoid repeating the errors of the strategic hamlet
program: forced relocation of people and an obsession with quantity.”287 As previously
mentioned, the forced relocation was arguably the most crucial of the previous mistakes
because the lands from which the peasants had been removed were the lands they had
lived their whole lives, just as their parents had before them, and their parents before
them. These truly were ancestral grounds in every sense of the term, as all ancestors of a
family were buried on these lands as well. By removing the peasantry from their lands,
the government had essentially removed them from the connections to their family.
Unfortunately, although the Chien Thang program addressed some of the previous
pacification issues, new problems arose, most of which were related specifically to the
execution efforts. The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) failed to remain in an area for
the amount of time necessary to provide for the continued protection for pacification
missions already engaged in at the time.288 It did, however, provide the basis for an
American approach to pacification through the “oil spot” strategy, which had been laid
out in a telegram from the embassy in Vietnam to the US Department of State. The
Americans realized that, in order to counter the Viet Cong, economic and political factors
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were both important in achieving pacification.289 Therefore, “as the armed forces
clear[ed] the identified VC forces from an area, it [was] essential to follow up quickly
with representatives of the civilian ministries of the government representing police,
education, public works, interior, information, rural affairs, health and finance.”290 This
formed the foundation for an oil spot strategy that would begin from Saigon.
By May 1964 the Chien Thang program was on the brink of failure and the
American embassy in Saigon and MACV teamed up to propose a new initiative based on
the oil spot concept. Known as Hop Tac, or “Victory,” the program was designed to
secure and pacify the areas immediately surrounding Saigon, then extending outward to
secure and pacify additional areas. By starting close to the South Vietnamese capital, the
area with the strongest anti-communist defenses, the program was provided with the most
secure spot from which the Hop Tac program could spread, in accordance with the oil
spot strategy. The major difference between the Chien Thang program and the Hop Tac
program was that MACV was put in control of the US’s support for the new program,
setting an important precedent regarding American military involvement in pacification.
Although the US was only involved in the program’s strategy and planning, “Hop Tac
foreshadowed the military’s later role in pacification support.”291 Unfortunately, the
program encountered several difficulties that led to its failure.
The first major difficulty that the Hop Tac program faced was the lack of police
officers needed to maintain law and order in the hamlets after ARVN had cleared them
and moved on. This meant that even though a hamlet had been cleared by South
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Vietnamese forces, there was likely to be little to no local security force guarding the
area, which would allow an enemy force to enter or reenter the “cleared” hamlet. There
was also a complete lack of guidance provided by the central government of South
Vietnam. For example, “civilian development projects such as the construction of
schools, market places, and maternity wards, were unable to make any progress due to
political instability in the national capital.”292
In an effort to aid pacification’s success, President Lyndon B. Johnson provided
Diem with a list of actions he needed to take in order to make progress in pacification.
For instance, the numbers of ARVN troops and South Vietnamese police forces needed to
be strengthened, while incompetent officers and commanders should be replaced, and
police powers required clarification and strengthening. The authority of provincial chiefs
also needed to be clarified and strengthened, while civic action programs needed to be
broadened and intensified. However, despite this advice, the South Vietnamese plans for
pacification had collapsed by early 1965.293 The nearly five-year string of massive
pacification failures at the hands of the South Vietnamese mission leaders, and something
had to be done to shift pacification’s momentum back to America’s favor. The joint
planning sessions were critical for establishing the objectives and tactics in such a
campaign but it was time for the US forces to take charge and find the best strategy to
win large-scale pacification efforts. The  South Vietnamese forces would still be utilized,
only now they would be a kind of support staff to facilitate the US’s pacification
missions.
293 Hunt, Pacification, 29-30.
292 Tho, Pacification, 104.
104
1965: Medical Aid & the CAP Approach
Beginning in 1965 American leaders were emphasizing civil actions in order to
facilitate South Vietnamese pacification. These actions were mainly focused on providing
medical aid and improvements in order to address “the necessity to reduce casualties and
damage to the civilian population.”294 The growing concern, and subsequent increase in
related actions, dated back to 1963, when American military doctors, corpsmen, nurses,
and other medical personnel travelled the Vietnamese countryside with their South
Vietnamese counterparts and provided medical and dental services free of charge.295
These programs seem to have been among the few pacification programs that both the US
leadership and the Vietnamese people welcomed and supported from the beginning.
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) pushed for missions with an increased focus on
medical aid, and therefore pacification efforts, in October of 1964, it was not until the
US’s military buildup in mid-1965 that others in the military seemed to have taken
interest in improving America’s pacification record.296
Arguably the “most realistically useful civic operation undertaken by US forces”
in 1965, according to Brigadier General Tho, “was the Medical Civil Action Program
(MEDCAP).” South Vietnamese citizens in rural parts of the country greatly appreciated
the program since it provided them with desperately needed medical treatments and
medicine. MEDCAP was conducted in conjunction with military operations, during
which American troops organized dispensary services and sick calls for locals in the
unit’s area of operation. Furthermore, although they served primarily American troops,
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US medevac (medical evacuation) helicopters were often utilized in emergency civilian
evacuations, like those that were caused by firefights with the enemy. A third invaluable
service provided by America’s armed forces came in the form of the USS Hope, a US
Navy (USN) hospital ship that “succeeded in saving the lives of many Vietnamese whose
illnesses or diseases could not be cured by local doctors or with local medical facilities
and technology.297 Thus, between mid-1965 and the end of 1968, American medical
professionals distributed more than twenty-seven million medical treatments while
establishing war casualty and provincial hospital programs to provide aid to citizens as
well.298 The emphasis on pacification efforts would continue to grow as the new year
dawned, albeit in very differing ways.
1965-1968: The CAP Approach
After the arrival of ground forces in March 1965, both the US Army and the
USMC attempted to understand how to best address the war’s pacification problems.
General Westmoreland and the Army decided to continue their top-down, large-scale,
search-and-destroy operations, focusing on destroying the Communist main forces before
it focused on pacification. The pacification efforts they did make were rather small in
scope and focused mainly on intelligence gathering operations. Units in the Marine Corps
were also searching for the best ways to approach the pacification campaign. This was
made easier on USMC leaders, who could draw on the “wealth of experience in foreign
interventions fighting guerrillas in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo'' between 1915
and 1934.299
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The US Marine Corps’ approach to pacification began as an experiment in 1965,
following their arrival in South Vietnam. After reaching their assigned area of operations,
I Corps, the USMC sought to occupy and defend three enclaves in the region: Phu Bai,
Da Nang, and Chu Li. It was in Phu Bai that the Combined Action Platoon experiment
began, conducted by the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Marine Regiment under Lieutenant
Colonel (LTC) William W. Taylor. The three rifle companies under LTC Taylor’s
command posed a major obstacle in his objective to defend a ten-square-mile area that
contained a critical airfield at Phu Bai. Knowing it was not enough manpower, Major
Cullen C. Zimmerman, Taylor’s second-in-command, suggested combining platoons of
the local militia into the 3rd Battalion’s defense efforts. Such an idea would become “an
integral part of the Marine Corps’ war in the I Corps area.”300
Known as Combined Action Patrols (CAPs), the USMC seemed like it might
have found one of the US’s best approaches for achieving pacification. Although CAPs
cleared South Vietnamese villages of enemy combatants, such as Army units did, CAPs
differed because the Marines were “inserted… directly into the securing process.”301
Designed to strengthen local security, a thirteen-man USMC rifle squad, one US Navy
hospital corpsman, and a thirty-five-man Vietnamese militia platoon from the
recently-cleared, local village’s Regional/Popular Force would be combined to form the
platoon. The CAP itself was designed to protect the village from enemy re-infiltration
from within as each Platoon “lived, worked, and fought in [the Regional/Popular force’s]
village until such time as the Vietnamese were capable of providing for their own
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protection.”302 These interactions also helped to create stronger, friendlier, more
trustworthy bonds between the US Marines and the civilians in the village, which was a
further benefit to pacification programs. There were also regular Marine battalions
stationed in the surrounding areas to support the CAP and its village through small-unit
operations like patrols and short-range search-and-destroy missions.303 CAPs showed
promising results, as the Marines instilled an aggressive, offensive spirit in their [local
force] counterparts,” while also demonstrating how “winning fights against local enemy
guerrillas… [the] combined unit upset the status quo by driving the communists out of
the villages.”304
Before any operational analysis of the Combined Action Patrols is discussed,
there is some very important data that needs to be addressed first. Even at the peak of the
CAPs program, there were only 2,220 Marines involved, representing “only 2.8 percent
of the 79,000 Marines in Vietnam.”305 One of the main reasons for there being only
79,000 Marines in Vietnam in 1965 was because it was approximately half of the total
number of Marines in the USMC. Only 2,220 of those in-country could be used on CAPs
because there were many other missions that required Marines at various areas in their I
Corps. According to critics of the Marines’ CAP approach, there were three major
operational failures that plagued the program.
The first, argued by General Westmoreland in order to support his attrition-first
approach, was that it would be hard to achieve pacification without first inflicting
significant damage on the NVA’s big-unit forces.306 This argument related to the second
306 Birtle, COIN, 399-400.
305 Kopets, “The Combined Action Program,” 80.
304 Kopets, “The Combined Action Program,” 78-79.
303 Birtle, COIN, 399.
302 Birtle, COIN, 399.
108
failure, that no CAP villages, by the end of 1968, had reached the point deemed as the
acceptable withdrawal point for the Marines stationed in the CAP villages.307 The final
failure was the most relevant reason that the Marines remained in CAP villages after
three years. “One of the biggest factors causing such mixed results were the significant
issues faced by the Vietnamese militia, issues that left them severely incapable of
defending their villages without aid from American Marines.”308 The inability of local
militia forces to provide for their own defense all but ensured Westmoreland’s argument.
However, if a reliable militia could be found and trained, the Viet Cong Infrastructure
was kept from reestablishing itself, and Marine units were freed up, the NVA would be in
a highly vulnerable state, in a foreign country, and under attack from an overwhelming
military force.
Along with these obstacles, it is important to remember the shockingly small
numbers of Marines available for I Corps overall and for CAPs more specifically, even
into their third year of war. Although undermanned, when those CAP Marines were
called in to clear and secure a village, the enemy stood little chance of stopping that train,
and often chose to put up some light resistance before retreating. The enemy forces knew
that it was much easier to re-infiltrate villages guarded by the local force units than repel
an American attack. For instance, with just 2,220 Marines eligible for operations, “CAPs
managed to secure over 800 hamlets and protect over 500,000 South Vietnamese
civilians.”309 The ability of CAPs to clear out a village that US Marines would live in the
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village alongside the citizenry for a certain period of time, demonstrated that the Platoons
did improve village security.310
Despite these issues, “some analysts speculate there would have been a much
different outcome to the war had the United States applied the Marines’ strategy on a
larger scale.” There were many military officials who, having seen the benefits of CAPs
firsthand, made similar statements. For instance, in his memoirs, USMC Lieutenant
General (LTG) Lewis Walt argued that “‘of all our innovations in Vietnam none was as
successful, and lasting in effect, or as useful for the future as the Combined Action
Program [CAP].’”311 Tran Dinh Tho, a Brigadier General in the South Vietnamese Army,
argued in his postwar pacification study that CAPs did indeed provide numerous realistic
benefits to the overall war effort. Among the most significant of these benefits was that
“the local population, living under permanent protection of these combined units,
developed trust and confidence in the GVN” and that “the presence of the CAPs also
denied the enemy infrastructure freedom of action.”312
Clearly the US Marine Corps’ Combined Action Patrol concept needed some
work, but it was not far from being turned into a pacification campaign that would be
capable of use throughout the entirety of South Vietnam. The US Marines were as
effective a clearing force as the US Army, but the USMC made more of an impact in their
acknowledgement of local security’s importance and in their dedication to help hold the
village. After the Marines joined the CAP, they are living and working alongside all of
the village’s citizens, while also teaching them valuable local military lessons. The
impact of the Combined Action Patrols were clearly significant because they allowed the
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citizens to let down their walls and reversed their unease around these men, supposedly
representing the Saigon government, who were now walking, working, waiting, and
talking with all other village people. That would play a major opportunity for someone
with a message that gave the rural citizenry a reason to begin trusting the South
Vietnamese government again. With just a fraction of the manpower, CAP members were
at least able to break down a barrier or two and start a conversation. Vietnam-wide
pacification campaign that would destroy VCIs along with their Viet Cong guerrillas.
Villages would be safe without needing a Marine Corps or CAP guard(s) to overwatch.
Finally would come the chance to deny the NVA large-unit forces any sort of aid
programs within South Vietnam. Between the program’s combat effectiveness and its
success in softening attitudes toward the South Vietnamese government, the CAP
program demonstrated that progress could be, and was being, made towards pacification.
1966: The Honolulu Conference and PROVN
Much of 1965 had utilized civic action plans to facilitate pacification, such as the
medical aid programs and the CAPs, and the progress made by those actions allowed
soldiers to interact with other members of the villages and form relationships with them.
Then, on December 6, 1965, McGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, suggested “a strengthened political and economic program” to
facilitate pacification.313 There were eleven components to the pacification campaign that
Bundy suggested to Johnson, including increased propaganda, efforts to improve health
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and education, agricultural reforms, anti-inflation programs, and anti-Communist
political organization.314
A focus on increased pacification was apparent early on with the convening of the
Honolulu Conference from February 6-8, 1966. During these three days, Johnson met
with South Vietnamese leaders General Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen
Cao Ky to discuss how to successfully achieve pacification in South Vietnam.315
Agreements were reached between the three leaders that addressed pacification issues in
four major areas: rural construction, health, education, and agriculture. In regards to rural
construction, they agreed that “building democracy in rural areas is as important as
military battles—rural construction is the central instrument in bringing about the social
revolution on which Viet-Nam is now embarked.”316 When it came to health concerns, the
GVN (South Vietnamese government) agreed to intensify its efforts to provide for the
basic medical needs of its people while the US agreed to considerably expand its medical
aid programs in an effort to achieve and exceed South Vietnamese medical needs. They
agreed to emphasize vocational and technical education. Finally, to confront agricultural
concerns, they determined that “increasing food production [was] a fundamental part of
the GVNʼs effort to create a better life for its people, and U.S. assistance in this [was] a
fundamental part of U.S. efforts to help the Vietnamese people build while they fight.”317
While the leaders of the US and South Vietnam were working out the actions they
intended to take in order to achieve pacification, known as winning the other war, some
civilian officials attempted to bring about change by pointing out the flaws in the current
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pacification policy and recommending alternative actions. The publication in March 1966
of a study entitled “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of
South Vietnam” (PROVN), which had been authorized by the US Army Chief of Staff,
represented a criticism of MACV’s big-unit warfare strategy and their focus on body
counts, after which it began “to lay the foundations for a greater emphasis on pacification
in 1967.”318 The increasing pressure for greater pacification efforts sparked by reports
such as PROVN recalled some attention back to the pacification issue, and civic action
programs were established in Vietnam. As more thought was given to the “other war” in
Vietnam, the war for the population’s hearts and minds, officials called for an increased
effort in national development projects which focused on “developing (a) national
political parties and (b) a long range economic development plan.”319 These projects were
to aid in pacification, or “winning over” the South Vietnamese populace thereby greatly
reducing, if not eliminating, the communists’ infiltration capabilities and providing the
South Vietnamese government with a strong, unified foundation of public support. The
US attempted to achieve this through civil service operations such as the construction and
improvement of roads and bridges, railroads, canals, housing and schools, as well as
operations that took American doctors into villages to administer medical treatment.
In a memorandum in August 1966, the Joint Chiefs provided their opinions on the
PROVN Report, which they viewed as extremely significant for three main reasons, the
first of which being that it presented “a conceptual approach to matters of major concern
in the US effort in Vietnam.” Secondly, it provided “a comprehensive digest of critical
factors influencing the internal situation in South Vietnam.” Finally, it was significant
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because it provided “background material for use in developing future concepts, policies,
and actions to improve the US effort in Vietnam.”320 However, by the end of the year, it
had become clear that, despite PROVN’s benefits, much still needed to be done. On
December 30, 1966, Foreign Service officer William Leonhart issued a memorandum to
President Johnson concerning his recent trip to South Vietnam. In it Leonhart
acknowledged that “the lack of progress in pacification remains the crux of the Vietnam
problem, largely determining duration and extent of the war, persistence or fade-away of
the NVA/VC forces, and the likelihood of negotiations.”321 The US, despite their
substantial successes against the communist main forces in 1966, had been unable to
successfully assist the South Vietnamese government in providing continual security at
local levels. This, in turn, disproved Westmoreland’s argument that by defeating the
enemy’s main forces first there would be much greater security information and a
relatively easier pacification. According to Leonhart, that inability represented “the gap
in our line” and “closing it [was] a major task for 1967.”322
1967: CORDS, the CIA, and the Navy
Although the American combat strategy still looked the same, when it came to the
land war, “what did change in early 1967, thanks to increased pressures for pacification
efforts, was the sequential aspect of MACV’s strategic concept.”323 Pacification efforts
and combat operations would no longer be separate from each other but, instead, would
now occur in coordination. This desire was codified May 1967 with the creation of the
Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) which
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unified American combat operations and pacification activities, those military-led as well
as civilian-led, under the command of MACV.324 Prior to this, all of the pacification
efforts had been conducted separately from the others, implemented by various civil and
military agencies, all of which acted independently from one another and oftentimes
world at cross-purposes. CORDS, as laid out by National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM) 362, he was run by the Deputy for Pacification, Robert W. Komer, who, in turn,
answered only to the Commander of MACV.325 The government’s main purpose in
unifying combat and pacification efforts was “to permit logistic and administrative
economies through consolidation and cross-servicing.”326 Why was the establishment of
CORDS so significant?
According to Colonel Edward P. Metzner, a US pacification advisor to South
Vietnamese district and provincial chiefs, “CORDS pulled together, under one undisputed
authority, all the complex, competing, and often redundant U.S. civil and military
pacification programs.”327 Arguably more important was its ability to use its influence to
achieve some semblance of coordination from the South Vietnamese government whose
efforts, up to that point, were fragmented and hardly effective. Metzner went so far as to
argue that, “given the problems of the Vietnam War in general and of pacification in
particular, it’s difficult to see how any real progress was made toward pacification before
CORDS was created.” He cited several CORDS actions as playing important roles in his
efforts to facilitate pacification at the local levels, including longer tours of duty for key
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personnel, the reintroduction of language training, and American superiors “who
understood the interdependence of pacification and military action and who tried to
influence policy accordingly.”328
Another government program that has garnered attention since becoming public
knowledge in 1970 and 1971 is the Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and
Exploitation Structure (ICEX), better known as the Phoenix Program. Operating between
1967 and 1972, the program was proposed as “a means to consolidate and unify
intelligence activities aimed at the destruction of the VCI.”329 Intelligence gathered
through Hamlet Informant Programs and interrogations at PICs were utilized in
sharply-focused attacks on the VCI by PRUs. In retrospect, according to Tho, “the
Phoenix program can be termed a reasonable success.” There were some internal
problems with the program, most significantly an inadequate amount of capable
intelligence personnel at the local levels. Another important problem was that “of
identifying and prosecuting VCI members operating under cover and living mixed with
the population.”330 Despite these obstacles, the program still managed to “neutralize” over
81,000 guerrillas, a euphemism for an enemy that had been captured, had surrendered,
had defected, or had been killed.
In accordance with NSAM 362, pacification efforts by the US Navy (USN) also
fell under the purview of CORDS. For instance, the US Navy made rather significant
contributions to revitalized civic action efforts by distributing 217,000 pounds of food,
373,000 pounds of wood, and over 57,000 pounds of cement to South Vietnamese
civilians during various pacification programs. Naval influence was at its highest in
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programs dealing with medicine and public health, such as in November 1967, naval
medics “performed 36,514 medical exams, 3,428 dental treatments, and 1,254
immunizations.”331 Despite the increased focus on pacification throughout 1967, the new
strategies and programs had yet to achieve the kinds of results desired. Although a
village’s VCI could be destroyed and the citizens’ support could be won, pacification
efforts alone failed to provide the equally important security factors that resulted from
battlefield victories. This argument, one that a significant number of American military
leaders continued to voice, seemed to be vindicated by the events of 1968.
1968: The Tet Offensive
When Communist forces launched the Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968, they
successfully drew US-GVN forces away from the countryside. Once the Allied forces
were distracted within the urban areas, Viet Cong guerrillas were sent back into the
pacified areas and began wreaking havoc. That main Communist goal had been
successful, and they quickly went to work to reestablish their VCIs before they were
ordered to flee. Ironically, the speed and effectiveness with which the Allied forces put
down the offensive prevented the Communists from reestablishing their VCIs to their
former strength. North Vietnamese regular forces had been destroyed to such an extent
that Viet Cong were called upon to support overt military activities and, as a result, the
VCI ranks were dealt their most significant loss ever.332
After the Tet Offensive had been put down, Allied forces “followed up their
victories by initiating a three-month pacification plan called the ‘Accelerated Pacification
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Campaign (APC),’ from November 1968 to January 1969.”333 The APC was facilitated
by the fact that much of rural South Vietnam had been left to Allied control as the
decimated Communist main forces withdrew to their base areas in border regions and, as
a result, “pacification began its most promising period at the end of 1968.”334 When
examining the Marine Corps’ CAPs strategy, developed two years earlier, a well-trained,
heavily armed military force assaulted an enemy area, combined with a local security
force to clear and secure the area by living in new areas secure the local force in charge
of protecting the area two years earlier.
Pacification Assessments and Conclusion
Pacification efforts were focused on addressing some of the underlying civic
concerns that could affect the war, such as President Diem’s need to make up for his
years of neglect of the South Vietnamese peasantry. While South Vietnamese,
anti-communist circles were strongest in the country’s urban areas, the peasants harbored
resentments toward their government, which Diem feared the Viet Cong would exploit
through a coup or revolt. To try and win back the peasantry’s support, Diem and his
officials created the Pacification and Development campaign in 1962, sparking a South
Vietnamese initiative known as the Strategic Hamlet program. This all but ensured the
government’s loss of countryside support, instead inspiring deep anger towards Saigon in
the peasants, who had to be uprooted from their ancestral homelands, were forced to
construct their own defenses, and protect themselves from the fierce Viet Cong and failed
to provide the material benefits that had been promised.335 To make matters worse, upon
arriving at the location of their new strategic hamlet, the peasants were forced to
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construct the defences themselves, all to protect themselves from the Viet Cong, who in
reality threatened the government officials more than the peasantry.336 In the end, the
program had inspired deep anger towards Saigon in the peasantry. Even more indicative
of the problems in Saigon was the fact “that ‘frequently, strategic hamlets were thrown
together in such slapdash fashion that Vietcong agents remained inside, acting as
informants for their comrades.’”337
The historiography of the Vietnam War has offered readers with several other
broad factors that plagued the war. For example, George C. Herring has pointed out that
“the fundamental problem was the absence of security.”338 Such an obstacle factored into
Brigadier General Tho’s position that one of the most obvious patterns in pacification
was that the campaign’s progress depended almost entirely on the level of security
provided by American and South Vietnamese forces.339 As Andrew J. Birtle has pointed
out, “the fruits of even the most successful pacification endeavor tended to be short lived,
as South Vietnamese officials frequently proved incapable of maintaining the gains
achieved by the departing Americans.”340 Another obstacle that became widespread,
especially before the creation of CORDS, was the lack of coordination between the
numerous US and South Vietnamese civil and military agencies. At the heart of the
problem was the military and civilian agencies’ separation of the responsibilities and
authority regarding pacification programs. There were also significant coordination issues
between the various civilian agencies that were involved. However, three weeks after
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Edward Metzner’s arrival, these coordination problems were ameliorated by NSAM 362
and the creation of CORDS.341
A lack of clarity in doctrine also proved detrimental to effective pacification
programs.342 American forces “did not always participate [or were ineffective] in
pacification operations, their powerful combat support assets and intervention capabilities
directly contributed to the clearing of several pacification areas.”343 They provided some
of  their most significant contributions by destroying the enemy with the most incredible
demonstrations of firepower. It was the USMC’s Combined Action Platoons, however,
that did the most good when it came to pacification. By living and working within a
village and providing security, the Marines were able to form good relations with the
South Vietnamese peasantry, gain their support, and make significant strides in
combating the Viet Cong.
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CONCLUSION
Between 1964-1968, America’s efforts in South Vietnam were plagued by a
variety of problems, but the Vietnam War was not unwinnable. The United States
possessed the requirements necessary to defeat its communist foes during President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration. At one point or another during those four years, the
US had the manpower, the superior weaponry, and the correct strategies to defeat the
North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong guerrillas, but only if it all came together at the
same time. The problem had been that American leaders, both civil and military, failed to
correctly and simultaneously piece their advantages together.
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One of the most significant military failures was the government-imposed
restrictions on potential areas of operation. While General William Westmoreland’s
search-and-destroy strategy was a feasible plan, it could only be successful if he had been
allowed to fully pursue the enemy into their base areas in Laos, Cambodia, and southern
North Vietnam. With the restrictions on cross-border operations, the US government
should have forced Westmoreland to abandon his pursuit strategy and follow a
clear-and-hold strategy. As the war demonstrated, a pursuit strategy stretched the US
Army out over large areas as they chased the North Vietnamese main forces across the
countryside, operations that ultimately failed to destroy the enemy before they reached
the safety of their cross-border sanctuaries. Meanwhile, Viet Cong guerrillas were able to
slip through the cracks and reinfiltrate areas that had already been cleared, rendering
those operations a waste of time and effort.
The cross-border restrictions on ground operations rendered the air war’s strategic
bombing strategy, exemplified by Rolling Thunder operations, more-or-less meaningless.
Such missions would have proven useful in softening up enemy defenses prior to ground
assaults or as a way of destroying the morale and economic production capabilities of a
more industrialized nation. However, since the former of these options had been rejected
and the latter did not apply to North Vietnam, the air war should have stopped wasting its
resources on strategic bombing missions and instead emphasized close air support actions
that repeatedly proved invaluable to ground operations. The US’s naval strategy proved
to be of significant benefit to the war effort, resulting in a near-impregnable coastal
blockade, a successful riverine interdiction campaign, and, most importantly, a
heavily-armed quick-reaction force capable of striking almost anywhere along South
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Vietnam’s rivers at a moment’s notice. The only improvements that could have been
made were developing and introducing the two riverine components earlier, a move that
would have potentially allowed for the US to gain an earlier, and possibly more complete,
grip on the South Vietnamese river system.
When it came to the pacification campaign, the American leadership should have
done more to ensure that their advisers understood their roles and responsibilities.
Equally important, it should have been stressed to the civic and military leaders of the
US’s pacification efforts that a well-coordinated and effectively conducted pacification
program was just as crucial as combat operations. The campaign would have further
benefited from a more thorough pre-deployment training program for advisers in order to
avoid the “learning through failure” situations depicted by Colonel Metzner’s memoirs. If
the US had made the necessary adjustments to align their strategies and tactics during the
time of their greatest strength, between 1965 and 1968, much greater and more
permanent success would have been achieved, significantly increasing their chances of
victory and preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism. The US and their South
Vietnamese allies, more than likely, would have been able to push the Communist forces
out of South Vietnam completely and win the war outright.
LBJ’s Decisions
As historian H. R. McMaster clearly stated, “the war in Vietnam was not lost in
the field… It was lost in Washington, D.C.”344 Jerome Doherty made a similar argument
but placed the blame specifically on Johnson’s decision making which led to
ill-conceived, often “contradictory, and ultimately self-defeating” strategies and
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actions.345 Johnson always knew that he could have won the Vietnam War by unleashing
the full power of the US military but, once self-limitations were decided on, the chances
for victory were all but squashed.346 Even those tasked with carrying out the war, such as
Lieutenant Frank Elkins, a naval fighter pilot who “could not understand why we were
not allowed to strike those targets and take those military actions that we knew were
necessary to win the war.”347 In retrospect, the Vietnam War does appear to have been one
of, if not the, worst-managed war in American history.348
McNamara’s Key Factors
In an attempt to deal with the war’s legacy, former Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara did what many others involved in the Vietnam War did when he published an
account of his wartime experiences. In his final assessment of the conflict he argued that
the United States failed to win the Vietnam War because of eleven major factors,
although several of them were inexorably linked to each other. For instance, McNamara
argued that one factor was the US’s misjudgement of their enemy and his motivations for
fighting.349 This was related to another of McNamara’s key factors, the American
misunderstanding of their South Vietnamese allies by viewing them “in terms of
[American] experiences,” and both factors combined to reflect the US’s “profound
ignorance of the… area.”350 However, it is the last of McNamara’s eleven key factors that
seemed to carry the most weight in his mind as he returned to it several times in his final
assessment of the war. The eleventh factor was America’s “failure to organize the top
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echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively” with the war. As a result, the US
was unable to analyze or debate their actions and unable to make adjustments when
failure and the need to change course became apparent.351
On one hand, one must take his argument with a grain of salt because it
represented a way for McNamara to shift blame for the American defeat elsewhere.
However, such an argument is more than compelling when the decisions regarding
America’s strategy and tactics are reviewed. Had those levels of the US government and
its military been properly organized, there likely would have been a much greater chance
to make the necessary adjustments. Those adjustments might very well have facilitated
the correct and simultaneous combination of the factors for victory, factors that the US
possessed but were, at the time, inadequately utilizing.
Ky’s Factors of Defeat
The idea of an incorrect course of action and the failure to make adjustments can
also be found in another Allied official’s assessment of why the US was defeated in
Vietnam. South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky argued that “the way in
which the Americans implemented the [limited war] theory lost the war for South
Vietnam.” The US war effort had been severely impeded, according to Ky, by their
fundamental mistake of employing a juggernaut-style force to fight a conflict that
required subtlety. He also addresses the issues regarding the US’s self-imposed
restrictions. Many of the actions originally restricted, Ky points out, eventually had to be
taken but by then it was too late and the cost of the delayed decisions came at a much
higher cost.352 Despite the embarrassment of losing a winnable war, and being defeated
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by a third-world country to boot, valuable lessons can be learned from America’s
Vietnam experience. John McCain summed it up best when he explained that the United
States “tried to win the conflict on the cheap, with no clear strategy for success.”353
Instead, McNamara reduced the military’s efforts to less-vigorous conflict alternatives,
none of which were an adequate substitute for a winning strategy.354
Ky’s argument is a valid one. It is true that many of the actions restricted during
the Johnson administration had to be taken later and that they were taken too late. If the
US wanted to use its juggernaut-style force, it should have allowed cross-border
operations against Communist sanctuaries. If it had been decided that the restrictions be
kept, bombing campaigns should have been focused on close air support missions while
ground troops held the ground they cleared. The Communists could have been forced to
retreat with one of these strategies or the other, but not both.
“Winnable” Analysis
Hindsight, of course, is twenty-twenty, and there is a chance that South Vietnam
still could have fallen following America’s departure. But as far as their intervention is
concerned, the strategic and tactical shifts mentioned here certainly would have given the
US and South Vietnam the greatest chance for success prior to 1968. According to
General Fred Weyand, “the Vietnam War was not unwinnable… it was just not winnable
Westmoreland’s war.”355 Whether or not the United States could have won the Vietnam
War has divided analysts between those who believe it was “winnable” and those who
believe it was “unwinnable.” To those of the winnable cohort, the war’s outcome could
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have been altered with a “more effective use of U.S. military power.”356 The belief that
the war was winnable “reflects the frustration over a conflict in which the United States,
through its superior firepower and mobility, seemingly won all of the war’s battles, but
lost the war.”357 Gradual escalation impeded American military efforts by depriving it of
the chance to directly assault the enemy.
General Westmoreland’s commitment to a strategy of search and destroy
compounded American problems by squandering the time, energy, and manpower
required to chase around the North Vietnamese main forces.358 The problem of wasted
resources was exacerbated by the fact that, as previously mentioned, US forces almost
always failed to inflict any significant casualties upon the enemy before they reached the
safety of their cross-border sanctuaries. Graduated force represented the worst American
action in Vietnam.359 “We didn’t employ military power to achieve a defined purpose,”
Dorland concluded, “we just hung on in a meat-grinder engagement and fought our
opponents in the arena of their greatest strength.”360 Instead of pursuing a strategy
focused on search and destroy missions with operational limitations, “the United States
should have carried the war fully and directly against North Vietnam.”361 America should
have taken the war to the enemy in their cross-border bases and in Hanoi, with both
airpower and ground forces. The limits placed on the air war as a result of gradualism
caused the campaign’s failure by preventing American “forces from waging the air
361 Hess, Vietnam and the United States, 174.
360 Dorland, Legacy of Discord, 158.
359 Dorland, Legacy of Discord, 157.
358 Hess, Vietnam and the United States, 174.
357 Hess, Vietnam and the United States, 173.
356 Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Boston: Twayne Publishers,
1990), 173.
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campaign to best calculate and achieve maximum results.”362 The US wasted over fifty
thousand lives, and eventually lost a winnable war, by failing to employ its overwhelming
military power.
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